The Other in International Law: “Community” and International Legal Order
Maxwell O. Chibundu*
“Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some crappy little country and
throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business.”1
“If I were explaining it to China's leaders, here's what I would say: Friends, with every
great world war has come a new security system. . . . The new world system is also bipolar, but
instead of being divided between East and West, it is divided between the World of Order and
the World of Disorder. The World of Order is built on four pillars: the U.S., E.U., Russia, India
and China, along with all the smaller powers around them. The World of Disorder comprises
failed states (such as Liberia), rogue states (Iraq and North Korea), and messy states — states
that are too big to fail but too messy to work (Pakistan, Colombia, Indonesia, many Arab and
African states).”2
On the face of it, there is a built-in paradox in the emergence of international law over the
last decade as a core concern of academics and policy-makers. On the one hand, it is difficult to
imagine any other period in history that has witnessed such a profusion of attempts to tame the
anarchical society by hedging it in a straight-jacket of legalities. Throughout the 1990s,
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Michael Ledeen, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, quoted by Lewis H. Lapham, The
Demonstration Effect, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, June, 2003, at 11. For a lively recounting of the tales of some of these
“crappy wars,” see MAX BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN POWER
(2002). Mr. Ledeen was generous in his specification of time. An examination of post-World War II history
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“crappy country” would be the five years between the “Mayaguez Affair” (1975), and the Iranian “hostage rescue”
debacle (1980); and it is surely no coincidence that the two presidents who presided over the U.S. during this period
(Messrs. Ford and Carter) are generally viewed as the two weakest presidents of the post-World War II era, if not of
the twentieth century. For one of the rare efforts at a sustained exploration of these assertions of power from the
perspective of “the other,” see CHALMERS JOHNSON, BLOWBACK: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN EMPIRE
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(positing and discussing the existence of a purported divergence of ethos between the United States and Europe in
the application of military force to issues of international law and international relations).
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Thomas L. Friedman, “Peking Duct Tape,” THE NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003. Cf. President George W. Bush,
Address to the 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2003): “Events during the past two
years have set before us the clearest of divides: between those who seek order, and those who spread chaos; between
those who work for peaceful change, and those who adopt the methods of gangsters; between those who honor the
rights of man, and those who deliberately take the lives of men and women and children without mercy or shame.
Between these alternatives there is no neutral ground.”
The simplicity of the imagery of “order” and “disorder” as the dividing line between the civilized “us” and
the untrustworthy “other” peppers the history of Western intellectual thought. As a student note writer has ably
demonstrated, it provided a powerful dichotomy that was at the core of the development of modern international
law. See Note, Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the Essentialization of Culture,” 106
HARV. L. REV. 723 (1993).

international conferences generated reams of treaties, codes, and agendas for action.3
International adjudicatory tribunals proliferated, and endeavored to give teeth to ideas and
obligations hitherto thought to be essentially aspirational.4 The individual – after all, the only
moral and sentient entity for whom laws actually have meaning – became as much the concern of
the international system as are nation states. And, as for the nation state, that primordial
privilege of “sovereignty” came under sustained assault, and from the United Nations’ Security
Council and government-sponsored judicial tribunals, no less than from human rights groups and
so-called “civil society.” Through the creation of international adjudicatory tribunals, the
issuance of specific orders to specific governments, the imposition of economic and other
sanctions on recalcitrant parties, and authorizations to use force, the Security Council has
seemingly become the embodiment of an international marshal: ready, willing, and able to
enforce international law. The result is that all across the globe, or at least that segment of it
with ready access to new information technologies (linked networks of computers, satellites,
audio and television feeds) people routinely speak of an international community.
And yet, the ability of international law to regulate state behavior has rarely been more
suspect than it is today. The mono-optic lens through which the United States views the
relevance of international law to the regulation of her global conduct – relevant when it confers
on her a benefit, and irrelevant when it purports to constrain her – far from being exceptional, is
actually illustrative of the approach taken by many members of the international society to
international law. The impact of international law (or lack of it) on Israel’s policies in the West
3

Thus, numerous multilateral conferences over the last decade have generated more or less binding legal
instruments in such diverse areas as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Art. 37(a), U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990); the
prohibition of “Child-Soldiers”; See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, General Assembly Res No 54/263, UN Doc No A/Res/54/263 (2000);
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36 I.L.M. 1507; Treaty on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 3.; the creation of,
and trading of, rights to pollute the environment; See Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, U.N. FCCC, 3d Sess., UN Doc. FCCC/CP 1997/y/Add.2 (1997), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. (1998).; a
permanent court for punishing international criminals; See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN
Doc No A/CONF.183/9, reprinted in 37 ILM 999 (1998).; and treaties for regulating international trade, See
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr.15, 1994,
Final Act, Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/20-val.pdf (last visited July 25, 2003).; bribery and corruption, See
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,
available at http://www.oecd.org (last visited July 25, 2003). And, of course, there have been numerous
conferences that have sought to make the world aware of concerns over and urging additional mandatory rules on
such matters as sex, racial and religious discrimination, global population, poverty, urbanization, the AIDS/HIV
“pandemic,” the need for clean drinking water, and Africa’s pathetic economic plight, among other issues. See
World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, August 31 –
September 7, 2001, Durban South Africa; Fourth World Conference on Women, September 4-15, 1995, Beijing
China; World Summit for Social Development, March 6-12, 1995, Copenhagen, Denmark; International Conference
on Population and Development, September 5-13, 1994, Cairo, Egypt; United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Habitat II, February 5-16, 1996, Istanbul, Turkey.
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Bank and Gaza is often decried, but international law does not appear to have been particularly
relevant to West Europeans as they fought the good fight of guaranteeing that the phrase “never
again” applies just as readily to ethnic-cleansing in the Balkans as it did to genocide in the
middle of Europe a generation earlier.5 Similarly, Russia appears ready and willing to throw off
the yoke of international legal constraints – or at least to unilaterally reinterpret to its benefit
those constraints – as it seeks to hold Georgia responsible for the limited success of the
Chechnyan war. And even in the domain of economic relations where one might ordinarily
expect the rule of law to be the norm, the ability of the powerful states to choose and pick which
rules to obey has been illustrated by the United States with regard to its willingness to consider –
if not adopt – the enforced licensing of the production and sale of the antibiotic, Cipro, while at
the same time vigorously contesting the rights of others such as India, Brazil, and South Africa to
do likewise with regard to the cocktail of HIV/AIDS antiviral medications.6 Similarly, the
unilateral conduct of the U.S. in placing limitations on steel imports,7 or the European Union in
regulating Banana imports,8 like the open and undisguised discussion in the United States of the
use of force in the occupation and management of Iraqi oil-fields,9 call into question the
continuing utility of focusing on law as the organizing principle in international relations. And,
of course, every privileged country unilaterally asserts its unalienable right to decide for itself
what rules, if any, it ought to abide by in regulating the in-flow of immigrants, whether such
immigration is governed by such international conventions as the 1951 Refugee Convention,10
the 1977 protocol, their regional analogs, or indeed other human rights laws. Thus from
Australia to Denmark, or Spain to Malaysia, and as a response to domestic political forces,
unilateralism reigns supreme in the visitation of disabilities on immigrants.11 And so,
international society continues to distinguish substantively and substantially between nationals
and “aliens,” citizens and non-citizens, insiders and outsiders, members of the community and
the “other.”12
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My purpose in this panoramic essay is to discuss the role of the idea of the “other” in the
construction of international law.13 I shall argue that it is only through such understanding that
one can make sense of the paradox (or paradoxes) that I have just described. Far from existing in
antithetical opposition to each other, I shall show that the frameworks of international legalisms
popularized in the 1990s were built upon, and in fact would not be viable without, the explicit
understanding that legalities are framed by reference to a constructed “other.” Rather than being
aberrational, the tendency and capacity of powerful states to seek to use rules to bind others
while exempting the application of such rules to themselves, are integral to international legal
order, and notwithstanding the 1990s, this is no less true today than it was previously. Indeed,
extralegal unilateralism may be a good deal more prevalent and pronounced precisely because of
the facade of legalities constructed in the 1990s.
As I shall explain, the push for universal international human rights springs out of the
same well as the emerging doctrines of outsider imposed “regime change” in disfavored
societies, and the imperial use of “preemptive defense” as a valid means of subjugating these
“pariah” or “rogue” states. Both approaches to the ordering of international society are bottomed
on a conception of community that is defined as much by the willingness to exclude and
ostracize the demonized other as by any desire to share with or include the outsider in a more
prosperous world. Purveyors of the emergence of an international civil society that is subject to
the rule of law, I shall argue, aim for and further much of the same goals with which diehard
proponents of realism in international relations have come to imbue international law. The
Western international human rights advocate, I shall contend (and no doubt heretically), is today
as much an ambassador of big power chauvinism in the service of a unilaterally determined and
fostered righteous cause as is the imperial legal realist of yester years. And more soberingly, I
shall make and defend the claim that international law, as a product of the Western
enlightenment, demonstrably offers no alternative possibility.
At the outset, then, I should state that this essay challenges the current dominant tendency
among those who see themselves as international lawyers to present international law as a
unified neutralist project whose object is to promote the welfare of all – or, at least, of the largest
number possible. I shall do so by exploring the relationship of the idea of law to that of
community, and more particularly by showing that because all laws are intelligible only when
understood within the setting of specific communities, and because the existence of a community
necessarily requires conscious acknowledgement of the outsider, the current articulation of
“universal normative principles” as “international law” – however arguably well intentioned –
serves primarily as a ruse to avoid confronting injustices that proponents of a dominant way of
life impose on those who are not quite lucky enough to be acceptable members of the dominant
always been defined in relation to exclusion from participation in West European (and North American) institutions
and interests. At the moment, Mr. Friedman’s assertion reproduced at the opening of this essay is a fair statement of
who today is viewed as “the other.” Not too long ago, that group most likely would have included the Chinese and
the Indians, and may yet again.
13
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“other” cuts across the traditional but artificial subject boundaries within which modern international law discourse
all too frequently takes place. Specifically, it seeks to show that those attitudes that shape human rights policies are
also at work in the context of decisions about the use of force and in issues related to economic rights. Secondly, that
the idea can be traced just as readily across time as across subject areas or space.

community.
Part I of the essay sketches in broad strokes the lineage of the treatment of the other in
international law between its enunciation and the demise of the post-World War II order at the
turn of the decade of the 1990s. A central claim of the essay is that many of the themes that
infect the ways that international law structures relationships between core members of the
“international community” and outsiders were present at its creation. Part II discusses the
transition from the post-World War II legal order to the “new world order” of the 1990s. This
review is undertaken primarily to illustrate affinities between international legal order (and its
subdisciplines) with international politics. Law is not an autonomous discipline. International
law is no less a social institution that operates within the constraints of socio-political and
economic environments than is domestic law. It is thus the embodiment and the projection of
power. Part III focuses on the relationship between international law and economic
development. Part IV is a meditation on the relationships between and among ideas of “law” and
of “community.” The idea of community, however ethereal it may sound, is the forceful product
of shared experiences among insiders. The outsider’s perception is not entirely irrelevant, but it
is secondary to the formation of a community. Similarly, however complex might be the
relationship of law to community, law, I argue, is shaped by the community, rather than the other
way around. Part V seeks to apply the ideas fleshed out in Part IV to our contemporary
“international community.” Here, I argue for less rhetoric about the extent to which
contemporary international relations reflects a regime that is governed by “the rule of law.”
I. THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
An account of the other in contemporary international law can conveniently commence in
1492.14 Dates, of course, are arbitrary demarcations, and are particularly so in the history of a
phenomenon that transcends generations of human experience. But just as an otherwise fleeting
moment of light striking an object, when brilliantly rendered by an artist or a photographer may
capture and encapsulate an entire zeitgeist, so also may an otherwise seemingly arbitrary date
effectively symbolize a historical movement. 1492 is one such date. It represents, as most
readers of this essay will readily recognize, the commencement of the European domination of
the Americas. But it was also a symbolic year for two other related reasons. It marked, as the
history books say, the final expulsion of the Moors from Spain, making the Continent of Europe
(if one excludes much of the Balkans and Turkey from this expression) “Christian.” Further,
with the successful navigation half-a-dozen years later through the Cape of Good Hope by
Portuguese sailors, Christian Europe discovered a route that permitted it to engage in intercourse
with the Asiatic civilizations of India and China without having to traverse the landmass of
Eurasia – much of which was under the effective control of the Moslem World.
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There is nothing original about this demarcation date. Karl Marx also saw 1492 as the beginning of European
imperialism, commenting in CAPITAL: “The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement
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It may be comfortably asserted, then, that 1492 marked the launch of the “Christian”
civilization of Europe into the dominant role that we now take for granted as its birthright in
global affairs. Moreover, that domination was transmitted through and perpetuated by Europe’s
mastery of the leapfrogging technologies of transcontinental communication, sea power being
only the earliest illustration of a model that was later to include steam power, the telegraph and
telephone, wireless communication, the jet engine and, of course, the Internet. What was crucial
about sea power (and indeed these other technologies) is that it permitted the European venturer
to visit and explore distant lands, partake of the experiences of those lands while untethered from
his own, and ultimately to return to his homeland and be reabsorbed by it.15
Since 1492 European civilization has created, dominated, and shaped international
society in a variety of ways, not the least of which has been legal. For analytical purposes, one
may divide these 500 plus years into five distinguishable periods. While the starting and
breaking points in each of these periods are, like 1492, artificial, each period, I shall argue,
embraced a distinctive mindset among Europeans (by which term I include the European
expatriates of the Americas and Australasia). Those mindsets were and continue to be shaped by
events on the ground, but they were given concrete form and were themselves sculpted in no
small measure by the articulation of normative legal doctrines.
There was the period of 1492-1648 which might be referred to as the Period of
Discovery. These were the years when, led primarily by Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and
England, Europeans discovered, mapped, traded with and colonized areas of the world that
hitherto had been unknown to each other. But this was a period of discovery not simply in the
physical sense, but just as crucially in the mental and intellectual senses. In a pattern that was to
recur constantly, the physical activities of European traders and explorers raised and sharpened
intellectual ferment within Europe. The result was that in seeking to understand its relationship
to the other, Europe was forced to examine its own internal relations, and to formulate those
internal relations as a means of dealing with the outsider.16
In the physical sense, the Catholic-dominated societies of the Iberian Peninsula divided
by papal edict and began the internal conquest and pacification of what is today commonly
referred to as Latin America. Portugal, whose sailors were – to say the least – persistent in their
search for an eastern sea route to Asia, also engaged in substantial commercial activities with the
peoples of Africa, whose coastal territories they traversed. Meanwhile, the predominantly
Protestant societies of Great Britain and of the United Provinces of Holland settled colonists on
the islands of the Caribbean Sea and on the continent of North America. They also engaged in
substantial trade and built occasional settlements in South-East Asia; more particularly in the socalled Spice Islands and Ceylon. All four societies preyed on each other’s commerce, but such
piracy was particularly virulent between subjects of the Catholic empire of Spain and the
Protestant kingdom of England.
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This was the setting for the emergence of those thoughts that today we acknowledge to
have been the genesis of contemporary international law. It was in this climate that the two
acknowledged progenitors of the discipline, Francisco Vitoria, a Spaniard, and Hugo Grotius, a
Dutchman, developed the concepts and norms that still shape current discussions of international
law.17 Three issues: the waging of war, the conduct of commerce, and the right to transit through
international waters (which is essential to both), have been primary concerns of international
lawyers. It is in the contributions of Vitoria and Grotius, particularly in their bifurcation of these
issues in terms of “us” and “them,” that the foundations of international law assert its relevance
for the contentions of this essay.18
For the purposes of this essay, Vitoria’s contribution to international law lies in his effort
to articulate the proper relationship between the conquering and colonizing Spaniards – a group
with which he shared cultural affinities – and the conquered indigenous peoples of Latin
America. Vitoria was concerned, among other things, with the circumstances under which the
Spanish colonists could justifiably engage in aggressive warfare against the native inhabitants of
the Americas. Determining the propriety of wars by reference to legal (as opposed to simply
expedient political) terms was not a new development in Vitoria’s times. The so-called “just war
tradition” which distinguished between right and wrong wars had influenced legal thinkers for
about a millennium prior to Vitoria, and its contours had been reasonably well understood for
three hundred years. Vitoria’s unique contribution to the debate was in his effort to suggest that
the laws which determined the propriety of war-making should not be confined to war among the
community of European or “Christian” societies, but that the doctrines embedded in such laws
were applicable to wars waged outside of the European community. In this sense, then, the laws
of war (or, more accurately, the laws that determined when wars could be fought) were jus inter
gentes rather than jus gentium. This did not mean that the same rules applied both within and
without the European communities, but it did mean that laws developed in Europe and applicable
to conflict among Europeans, could be extended to embrace interactions between Europeans and
non-Europeans. Notably, Vitoria framed the justice of making war in terms of the treatment that
the insider accorded the outsider within the insider’s community. Insiders, he seemed to say,
owed a duty of hospitality to outsiders. This worked of course, since the Spanish conquistadors
were the ones intruding into the societies of the native populations of the Americas; and while
Vitoria may have framed his duty of hospitality in reciprocal terms, he could do so with the
certainty that neither Catholic Spain, nor European society generally, was going to be invaded by
a horde of Native Americans.
Grotius built on Vitoria’s seminal insight which, at one and the same time, sought to
impose international legal duties on non-European peoples, while showing little concern about
the reciprocal obligations of Europeans to those peoples.19 In the process, Grotius made
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pronounced and explicit the multipartite structures of the emerging international legal order. He
did this both with regard to war-making and commercial transactions.20 In the first place, there
were those laws of war and of commerce which were concerned primarily with the relationships,
inter se, of European communities. Thus, among this group, there was to be the freedom to
navigate the seas, proper diplomatic exchanges, and the like. Second, there were those laws that
regulated the relationship of one European community to a non-European community. Thus,
while free navigation and free trade were to be encouraged in inter-European intercourse, Grotius
found it perfectly consistent with international law for European societies to enter into exclusive
contractual arrangements with non-European princes. Thirdly, there was the question of how
one European society should deal with the relationship between a European society and a nonEuropean one. Here, Grotius advocated that European societies respect the terms of such
arrangements, without regard to whether they would have been acceptable if entered solely
among Europeans. Fourth, there were those situations where Europeans engaged in interactions
with each other outside of Europe. Grotius suggested that such relationships were to be
regulated by the same rules and norms that would operate had such interactions occurred within
Europe. Fifth, one might ask what international law rules regulated relationships among nonEuropean peoples in their interactions with each other. Here, as might be expected, neither
Grotius nor Vitoria offered any answers; for, international law was essentially about the law of
European societies and their dealings with non-Europeans. Finally, one might also ask how nonEuropean societies were to relate to European societies. Here, we find that to the extent
European scholars sought to articulate rules, they were of a non-reciprocal character. Thus, both
Vitoria and Grotius clearly asserted the right of Europeans to trade peaceably with nonEuropeans, and the right of the free movement of Europeans within non-European lands. Less
obvious were the duties which Europeans owed non-Europeans, or what rights non-Europeans
could assert against Europeans.
The second period in the development of what we now refer to as international law may
be said to have run approximately from 1650-1790. This was the moment of the consolidation
and triumph of the absolutist secular monarch not simply as a ruler, but as the embodiment of an
entire nation state. The French, Austrian, Russian and Prussian monarchies were exemplars of
this institution. These were all predominantly land-based powers, and the primary focus of their
legal relationships tended to be inwards. International relations was the relationship among
fraternal princes, rather than issues of trade and colonial settlements. Wars were important, but
with the exception of those against the Ottoman Empire, such wars were just as easily viewed as
sporting games to be resolved in conferences terminated by the signing of ad hoc treaties, as by
appeal to any overarching normative principle. Not surprisingly, then, the international legal
thought of this period was intricately interwoven with internal philosophical inquiries about the
source and scope of the right to rule. The preeminent international legal scholars of the period
focused less on interstate relations than on the internal construction of governance. Hobbes,
INT’L L. REV. 1515 (1999) (assigning to Grotius an inclusive universalist ideology).
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Bowdin, and Pufendorf articulated one vision of those relationships, while Locke, Montesquieu,
and Kant provided counterpoints. Contacts with the non-European worlds continued, but these
contacts did not generate the sort of serious inquiry that the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries’
voyages of discovery had inspired. When difficulties arose, these were resolved pragmatically
and usually within national frameworks, administrative or judicial.
The third period extended roughly from 1815-1914. This is a period to which at least one
writer has referred to as the “golden age” of international law.21 This was the age of the so-called
“balance of power,” and fixed notions of national identity were essential to the maintenance of
the balance of power. But national identity was not simply limited to the opposition or
juxtaposition of say the English to the French, or the German to the Slavic, but indeed of Europe
(or persons of European ancestry) to Asia and Asiatics. With the industrialization of Europe, and
its colonization and projection of power throughout much of the world, the superiority of Europe
was manifest, and a seemingly self-evident dichotomy was Europe as “civilized” and much of
the rest of the world inhabited by “uncivilized peoples.”
It is hardly surprising then that these realities and attitudes were reflected in the
international law jurisprudence of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The overriding
feature of that jurisprudence was the emergence of positivism as the legitimating principle of
legal rules. The secular state with effective control over a population was legitimately entitled,
by virtue of that control, to prescribe governing rules for the society. Like virtually all
principles, this doctrine was deployed in the service of the good as well as of the bad, of the
beautiful as well as the ugly. Positivism lay behind the successful abolition of the transatlantic
slave trade; a success that generated one of the lasting principles of international law, that of “jus
cogens.” But the same principle also underpinned the hands-off approach that European states
took to the internal colonial policies of France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium
(among others). Thus, international law was indifferent to the inhumanities of King Leopold in
the Belgian Congo,22 and it explicitly endorsed the capitulations system under which European
powers secured for their nationals in such non-European societies as Egypt and China uniquely
special access to the administration of the laws.23 Similarly, the role of power as the legitimating
force in the relations of European to non-European societies was evident in the frequent use of
force by the former to compel acceptance of dictates by the latter. “Gun-boat” diplomacy, as
these practices came to be known, were accepted, and legal, features of the international law of
that period.
A dominant component of Western intellectual thought in the Twentieth Century was the
questioning of the underlying dichotomy of “civilized” and “non-civilized” peoples which had
underpinned and rationalized the subjugation and ravages of non-Western populations since
1492. The increasing savageries of European wars during the century between 1850-1945,and
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the barbarisms of many European colonial policies undercut claims of a distinctively humane
European civilization. These doubts gave rise to two of the most prominent contributions to
international law in the twentieth century: the prohibition of the use of force in interstate
relations, and the enshrining of the principle of self-determination of peoples. These principles
were to become the cornerstones of the fourth period of international law, 1919-1992, and they
flourished in an atmosphere in which positivism was the driving force of intellectual legal
discourse.
But just as important to the doctrinal development of these two principles was the fourth
period’s other structural contribution to the development of international law: namely, the
creation of permanent international judicial tribunals to interpret and enforce international law
doctrines. Indeed, the emergence of such tribunals was necessarily the culmination of
positivism, on the one hand, and the prohibition of the use of force on the other. Adjudicatory
tribunals with authority to make binding their interpretation of international laws symbolized the
emergence of an international community with authority and competence to override the ad hoc
preferences of individual member states. “Consent” was the hallmark of this regime, but the
consent once given became effective and could not be revoked at the mere whim or caprice of
the giver. In other words, consent itself was regulated by enforceable law. Positivism thus
channeled and constrained the exercise of international authority while making it legitimate.
It is against this backdrop that one must explore what I shall contend constitutes a new
(fifth) period in the articulation of an international legal order. Like the other periods, this new
period is not a complete break with the earlier periods. Its features, which I shall describe below,
are sufficiently different, and sufficiently animated by a different set of philosophical
understandings from those that had operated in the fourth period, that they can be fairly seen as
constituting a distinctive phase in the development of international law. Moreover, as with the
other periods, the use of the date of 1992 is as much for convenience as it is to suggest a precise
historical demarcation. But the choice of the date is far from being arbitrary.
II. A NEW WORLD ORDER
In 1992 very few observers doubted that the international relations system was in the
throes of a new political order. The bipolar system around which international relations had been
organized since at least 1947 was brought to an emblematic end when, at the end of 1991, the
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was declared defunct, and Boris Yeltsin took over from
Mikhail Gorbachov as the ruler of Russia. Only a few months earlier, the United States had
demonstrated its unparalleled military and political prowess when it organized, and then with
unheard of precision, destroyed the Iraqi army in a predominantly air-borne campaign.
The ability of the United States in 1992 to obtain from the United Nations security
Council the issuance, under Chapter VII, of a demarche to Libya requiring the latter, without
regard to established international legal principles, to surrender Libyan citizens to either the
United States or the United Kingdom for their alleged involvement in the planting of an
explosive device in a U.S. commercial aircraft that exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, simply
confirmed the emergence of what the United States President termed “a new world order.” Some
observers snickered at the use of this phrase, and in time the phrase went out of vogue, but there
is no denying that there were fundamental paradigmatic shifts in the way that people (academics,

government officials, diplomats, jurists, and journalists, among others) thought and talked about
the international order (or disorder) in the 1990s, and the way in which they did so previously.
And even more critically, there is no denying the interactive relationship between these new
ways of thinking and talking about the international system, on the one hand, and the behavior of
actors (governments, soldiers/diplomats, international institutions, and non-governmental
organizations) in the system on the other. Below, I shall explore four of those fundamental
paradigmatic shifts, but as will be evident, these shifts cannot be understood without the
reference point of the quintessential primacy – actually supremacy – of the “West”24
(spearheaded of course by the United States) over “others” in the international system. This
doctrine, which in other contexts has been termed “essentialism,” I shall demonstrate, has been
the hallmark of the post-1992 international legal order. It differs from its predecessor in the
magnitude, comprehensiveness, and boldness of its assertion and deployment. In this sense, it is
as much alike to its predecessors as the adult is to the embryo.
A. Legitimate Neoliberal States Versus Illegitimate Pariah States
It is common place to date the beginning of our contemporary international system to the
1648 Treaty of Westphalia. Through a legal instrument, the (Christian) princes of Europe
ordained and enshrined the modern secular interstate system. Big and small princes, Protestant
and Catholic, alike, agreed to establish peace among themselves and to deal with each other on
the basis of their juristic equality. All also agreed to extend protection to those present in their
territory without regard to religious affirmations; and in-so-doing, to be free from the
interference of those princes who had constituted themselves as the protectors of persons or
particular religious beliefs. Thus, we’re often told, was born the secular interstate system
characterized by the twin principles of internal independence from external interference, and
juristic equality. These twin pillars are often referred to in shorthand as “state sovereignty”.
Although contrary to common place wisdom state sovereignty rarely has been thought of
in absolutist terms,25 it is fair to say that respect for the idea was the dominant controlling
principle of international law during the Fourth Period. It is embedded in what is acknowledged
to be the cornerstone of the United Nations Charter, namely, article 2(4), which prohibits the use
or threat of the use of force against the political independence or territorial integrity of a member
state of the Organization. But if the principle was one that was suited to regulating the interstate
warfare that characterized European political developments in the post-1648 world (particularly
following the completion of the formation of the last great European state, Germany, in 1870), it
was one that proved to be ill-suited to the post-1945 order which the United Nations charter
sought to regulate. Increasingly and assertively, this order became less and less predominantly
European and less and less prominently Christian. More significantly, the causes of war
resembled less those of the post-1870 European order (interstate conflicts usually over the
distribution of territorial boundaries, economic resources, and political power), and were more
24
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akin to those which prevailed prior to 1870.
The primary sources of military conflict in the post-1945 order related to matters of
internal state formation. To what extent was a minority group within an established state entitled
to secede and set up its own state – peaceably, if possible, or by force otherwise? What rights
did a majority population have to forcibly overthrow a government run by the minority segment
of the population? Was a perennially disempowered group entitled to use force to compel
power-sharing within a polity? The international legal order provided no authoritative responses
to these questions, and in an order in which all issues revolved around the possession of
preponderant military power by two alliances, most such internal conflicts, however genuinely
internal their origins, were soon translated into proxy conflicts among these polar alliances.
Moreover, in many instances, the nature of warfare in the post-1945 world was radically
different from that which had characterized conflict among European societies, and which had
therefore shaped international thinking about war. In particular, war as involving the
confrontation of massed armies wearing national insignia along defined battlefields was, in the
post-1945 world, the exception rather than the rule. Rather, war more likely to consist of “hitand-run” exchanges between asymmetrically equipped forces operating within underdetermined
boundaries. Such a climate readily facilitated the covert proxy wars in which the Soviet Union
and the United States readily converted internal wars into international conflicts, the resolution
of which the international system was entirely ill-equipped to address.
But the success of the United States in its “Gulf” war, and the failure of the Soviet Union
in holding together as a state, rendered intolerable the continuing fissions in the international
order which the system, out of necessity, hitherto had accepted. Those who viewed their
ideologies, interests, and institutions as reflected in the triumph of the United States promptly
asserted the superiority of those ideas, interests, and institutions over all else. No state which did
not embody and give prominence to these ideas, institutions, and interests was entitled to
recognition as a state. Moreover, the international legal system was obliged to de-legitimize any
competing views other than those espoused by these triumphalists.
Francis Fukuyama’s End of History26 was the seminal exposition of the zeitgeist.
Although many Western intellectuals now distance themselves from Fukuyama’s claims, there is
no denying its representativeness as the statement of the conventional viewpoint in the West
among politicians, opinion-shapers, and the general public. The failure of the Soviet Union
validated and vindicated the correctness of Western Liberal Capitalism as the organizing idea for
humanity. In Fukuyama’s lingo, liberalism was the ideal for which humanity had been striving,
and in the political, economic, and military triumph of the United States and Western Europe,
mankind had finally arrived at the complete realization of that ideal.
International Law scholars wasted little time in translating Fukuyama’s strident polemics
into the sedate crypto-conservative creed of reasoned analysis and dispassionate elaboration of
“norms.” Essentially, these writers distilled three principles as regulating the “new world order.”
There was, they said, an “entitlement to democratic rule” under international law. Governments
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that could not establish their mandate to vvox populi were therefore illegitimate, and not entitled
to the traditional rights, prerogatives, or courtesies they or their nations typically expect under
international law. These governments, and the societies they ruled, were thus not members of
the international community. They are pariah states. Second, International legitimation also
requires that a society be governed by “the rule of law.” This mandates that the institutions and
practices of the society be “transparent”; i.e., comprehensible to Westerners. Substantive norms
such as those that define “corruption,” women’s rights, freedom of press and of property take on
legal meaning only when framed in terms that are fully consonant with “Western values.”27
Thirdly, success in the international system, it was often intimated, hinged on the willingness of
a society to accept and build on those free economic institutions which had made the West the
dominant force in the international order that it had become; that is, the market system for
organizing the production, accumulation, and distribution of resources.
A universal regime that embraced these concepts was the driving force of international
relations and international law in the 1990s. The boldness and straightforward assertion of the
universal applicability of these ideas, and the claim of unity of the ideas, thus distinguish the fifth
period from those that had preceded. Meanwhile, the new technologies of the “digital” and
“information” “revolutions,” which permitted near-instantaneous communication at relatively
little cost (at least in the West), had transformed the planet Earth into a “global village.” Nation
states were no longer the ultimate (or perhaps even primary) arbiters of the destinies of mankind.
Human beings were free to form their own associations and identities, and to have them fostered
and respected under international law. The “state” was shrinking, and international “civil
society” expanding. Simply put, the international law apostles of the “end of history” posited a
universal society in which all individuals were members of a single international community. In
this vision, there was no “other”. International law equitably subsumed the interests of all, and
dispensed justice without regard to nationality or the other traditional cleavages of international
law.
To understand the post-1992 international legal order, it is important to consider these
claims. Further, it is only after one appreciates the thrusts of these claims that one can make
sense of the events of the heady 1990s, and more particularly, those which now dominate the
current international order – legal, political, and economic.
B. The Democratic Entitlement and the International Legal and Political Order
The claim that the post-Cold War world order could accept as legitimate members only
“democratic” societies was advanced on deontological and consequentialist grounds.
Democratic governance, the argument ran at one level, is an entitlement for which the human
spirit consistently yarns. It is inherent in the ideas of liberty and of happiness. And it is at the
core of the great Western civilizations of Greece, Rome and the United States. It was the
animating spirit of the European Enlightenment and the two Great Revolutions of 1776 and
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1789, and it is man’s continuing obligation to nourish it, and to make sure it continues to
flourish.28 But beyond this appeal to faith, proponents of democracy as a necessary key to
admission through the gate of the new world order submitted several practical reasons for their
insistence. Among those claims were that, as an empirical matter, democratic states did not go to
war with each other.29 Moreover, and of particular resonance for international lawyers,
democratic states followed the rule of law both in the regulation of their domestic governance
and in their transnational relationships.30 As such, they respected the dignity of the person,
honored the human rights of all persons, were less subject to corruption and to other forms of
misfeasance, and kept the compacts they made with their citizens and with outsiders. Similarly,
democratic states necessarily embraced the market system of organizing economic interactions,
grounded, as the latter is, on respect for the sovereignty of individual choices. It is thus hardly
surprising, then, that societies whose economies were based on the market system were also the
richest and those who provided best for the welfare of their citizens.
But proponents of the democratic entitlement did not rest on these intellectual arguments.
Many were also keen to demonstrate the determinism of their beliefs. They contended not
simply that democracy was a good thing, but that it was so inherently good that it was sweeping
through all of “humankind,” without regard to geography or culture. It was an entitlement not
only because reasonable persons would opt for it, but because it was what societies, whether
their rulers liked it or not, were opting for.31
It was but a small step to move from this claim of an internally generated locomotion of a
theory of democratic pull, to the advocacy of a robust push in international relations and
international law to the universal adoption of democracy as an end in itself. Liberal market
societies, henceforth, were to condition their relationships vis-à-vis the rest of the world on the
acceptance by the latter of democratic rule. Economic assistance would be given only to those
“less developed” states that undertook without question to follow the trinity of “democracy,”
“rule of law,” and “free market” (sometimes collectively dubbed as “good governance.”)32 And
having taken this step, one could hardly expect the application of coercion in support of a
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fervently believed-in ideology to be limited. The imposition of economic sanctions on
recalcitrant states and, ultimately, the use of military force for “humanitarian purposes” soon
followed. Arguments that these naked assertions of force violated the rules of the post-1945
international legal order were readily dismissed by pointing to the greater good at stake. The
new international law is to protect individuals, not states. There is a single universal community,
and Western governments and peoples cannot stand by while Third World dictators and “ethnic
cleansers” perpetrate untold evils on their kin. If the old law was inadequate to address these
problems, then the international community should create new laws.
In time, this expansive view of the “democratic entitlement” generated its own antithesis
and backlash. Many of those whose scholarly work had formed the basis for the polemics of the
newly fanged world order began to protest that their disciplined and carefully segmented analysis
of the disintegration of the old order and the birth of the new had been misconstrued and
misapplied by zealots. That a “third wave” of democratic governance had sprang up in the
1980s, argued one influential theorist, should not be mistaken for the universality of a single
democratic culture.33 To the contrary, there remain fundamental differences among the various
“civilizations” of the world, and one should not see in democracy or in the particular triumphs of
the West the convergence of a single world order.34 Others pointed out that despite the tendency
to invest in “globalization” and the homogeneity of societies, there remain fundamental cultural,
social, and economic differences between the impoverished worlds of Africa and Asia, and the
opulence of Western Europe and North America.35 In the legal context, some writers made
explicit that their idea of an international community was limited to “liberal democratic”
societies. The convergence of interests and rules which they preached did not thus apply to all
members of the international society, but only to a limited subset of the countries of Western
Europe and North America.36 In fact, some writers questioned whether the same legitimating
effect accorded the democratic process in the West should be extended automatically to some
non-Western societies.37 As these writers recognized, legal and political institutions are
culturally derived and fostered. And, contrary to the attitudes and assertions of the “end of
history” theorizers, there is no universal culture. As such, legal rules and political institutions are
framed by and respond as much to expedient facts and considerations as to any normative
beliefs. In the 1990s, no less than in earlier times, the international system continued (and must
continue) to distinguish among cultures.
In practice, Western policy-makers, even as they rhetorically embraced the concept of a
democratic entitlement, frequently discriminated quite significantly in its application to societies.
It was overridden in such societies as Algeria, Pakistan, and Turkey, but enforced with varying
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degrees of rigor against Nigeria, Kenya, and Zimbabwe.38
Ultimately, of course, just as one cannot make sense of facts without theory, it is equally
true that the validity of any theory must be gauged against the facts on the ground. Here, the
claim of a “democratic entitlement” as an international legal principle fails abysmally. There is
no denying the normative preference for democratic governance over despotic or dictatorial
rule.39 Democratic rule is more likely to assure governmental accountability than other
contemporary forms of government.40 But it is absurd to claim that democratic rule will
necessarily lead to international justice. As Prof. John Norton Moore has pointed out, all
governments, whether democratic or not, seek to externalize costs41 while, of course,
appropriating the benefits. The extent to which a society can, in fact, impose its costs on others
has relatively little to do with its form of governance, and more to do with its power. And there
is no evidence whatever that democratic government makes its individuals or rulers more willing
to bear the cost of failure than is the case in non-democratic societies. Indeed, if we accept that
democratic rule forces individuals to account for their errors, then it may very well act as a
disincentive to individuals owning up to those errors or, which is the same thing, it promotes the
tendency of individuals to seek to shift blame to others.
In any event the “democratic entitlement” has been framed (and indeed under the
contemporary geopolitical order can only be framed) in national terms. Even in its most
idealized form, then, the resulting government will be accountable and responsive only to the
members and interests of the national polity. If those members are shortsighted or those interests
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xenophobic, the democratic process will reinforce rather than constrain their expression.42
Indeed, the democratic system may have built into it a reinforcing perverse incentive to be unjust
to nonmembers of the community; that is, to “outsiders” or “others.” Leaders of a national
community, in order to obtain the requisite approbation of the national citizenry will present their
stewardship in comparative terms vis-à-vis outside communities. Naturally enough, where the
national welfare is visibly superior, the leaders will claim that it is the result of their superior
skills and national spirit. Conversely, an inferior national welfare will be blamed on the evil
machinations and unfair practices of the outsider. The more obvious is the cleavage between the
national society and the outsider, the easier it is to attribute success to national spirit and failure
to unfairness of the outsider. And, since the leaders are the product of the general population, the
citizenry is unlikely to disagree; for to do so is to confess its own errors. There is, in short, a
conspiracy of silence within a democratic community in which questioning the explanations of
the rulers is to question the decision of the entire society.43 Thus, it is easier for “democratic”
societies to contrast themselves with “authoritarian” ones; a contrast that is made even easier
when such contrasts are paralleled by and paired with (usually discretely and only inferentially)
economic, linguistic, scientific know-how, racial, or religious dichotomies.
Consider one of the classic claims in support of the proselytization of democratic
entitlement. As I have already observed, many Western scholars routinely affirm the superiority
of the Western way of life over others on, among other grounds, the idea that democracies do not
go to war with each other. While positing this assertion as an empirically verifiable proposition,
these scholars rarely pause to explain why this purportedly observed relationship exists. Since
these scholars do not assert that democracies never engage in warfare, that the causal
relationship, if any, does not flow from the mere existence of a democratic society, why then do
democracies engage in war with non-democratic societies but not with each other? One
explanation might be that all wars are started by non-democratic societies, and that democracies
engage in war only as a defense. But history is littered with instances in which the likes of The
United States, The United Kingdom, France and Israel – to name indisputably democratic
societies – have commenced wars.44 Moreover, there is no evidence that democratic societies
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find the waging of war any more or less palatable than non-democratic ones. The incineration of
civilian populations in Dresden, and the explosion of atom bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
not to speak of the use of napalm, fuel air, depleted uranium, and cluster bombs have, after all,
been the chosen instruments of war by a democratic society, the United States.45 Nor have these
uses of weaponry, targeted as they have been just as much at civilian populations and
infrastructure as at military targets, elicited any especially resonant condemnation from the
members of that democratic society. The simple truth – however unhappy it may be – is that
members of a democracy are no less likely than those of a non-democratic one to avail
themselves of any weapons at their possession as long as that weaponry is not directed at
themselves. Indeed, the one apparent difference between democratic and non-democratic
societies in the waging of war is that leaders in the former are all too well aware of the
consequences to their personal career of failure,46 and as such, employ the means most calculated
to lead to victory in the shortest time possible.
On the other hand, if one focuses on democratic rule not as the cause, but as an effect of
structured relationships within a society, the inconsistencies described in the previous paragraph
can be quite easily explained. Suppose, for example, democracy is understood (as it properly
should be) not as the creator, but as the product of an economic environment in which overriding
concerns are no longer merely about those of daily subsistence, then one can begin to see that
there is in fact a correlation between democracy and wealth, and the question can be reframed
not as to why democracies do not go to war with each other, but why wealthy societies do not go
to war with each other. Recasting the question permits a reasonably dispassionate observer to
focus less on the smugness of being a democratic society, and more on what can be done to
relieve poverty and perhaps enable a democratic environment in which redistribution through
force becomes less likely. But such an approach would require international legal scholars in the
West to spend sometime understanding the “other”; to reflect on the relationships that exist
among members of societies other than their own; to focus on the interaction of economic
welfare with such social and political institutions as education, health, the organization of a
praetorian military, and the structures of kinship or religious-based political systems other than
those commonly found in the West. But these are precisely the sort of inquiries that Western
international legal scholars, dating all the way back to Grotius, have never been willing to
undertake. The unfortunate truth is that international legal scholars have always found it more
appealing – because it is easier – to foist unto the rest of the world the system within which they
believe themselves to function, than to try to understand alternative possibilities. The claim of a
“democratic entitlement” as an international legal norm fits well into that bludgeoning tradition.
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Notably, it was the “liberal democratic” United States – not the “communistic, atheistic” Soviet Union – that has
consistently refused to foreclose the use of nuclear weapons as a first strike instrument of war. Indeed, the United
States has apparently threatened adversaries with its use. See R. Jeffrey Smith, U.N. Says Iraqis Prepared Germ
Weapons Gulf War; Baghdad Balked, Fearing U.S. Nuclear Retaliation, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1995, at A1.
Similarly, the United States has explored the use of “neutron weapons,” whose explicitly intended purpose is to
annihilate living organisms even as it leaves inanimate objects unharmed. Democracy, then, whether of the elective
or deliberative model, is no assurance that the destruction of the lives of the other will be minimized in a condition
of war.
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Thus, the United States’ most influential newspaper, in discussing whether the United States should invade Iraq,
wryly observed that the decision had to be made early in the new year before “the presidential election cycle
intrudes.” (Emphasis added.) See Patrick E. Tyler, Urgent Task for Rumsfeld, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at A1.

None of this is to suggest that democratic rule should not be preferred over nondemocratic forms of governance. The straightforward argument that I’m advancing here is that
as a means for organizing an international society that gives due regard to the interests of the
other in formulating national policies, the “democratic entitlement,” far from being a helpful
ideology, is antagonistic to the promotion of a universalist zeitgeist. Wedded as it is to the
promotion of the narrow and immediate self-interest of the participants within a community, the
democratic ideal should be acceptable only in an international environment that is devoid of
fundamentally ascriptive cleavages and stratifications. Contemporary international society is
nowhere near such a nonhierarchical regime. As such, the argument for the recognition of an
international legal doctrine that legitimates only those societies that embrace “democratic rule” is
no more than a rehash of the age-old concept that the West can rightfully rule non-Westerners
because the latter are uncivilized; a principle that dates as far back as the Spanish conquistadors,
if not as early as Rome and the Punic wars.
C. We Are Each Other’s Keeper?
A well-publicized technique (at least in American movies) of investigative law
enforcement is the so-called “good cop/bad cop” act. If the declamation of the “democratic
entitlement” frames the bad cop threatening the errant “failed state” that it had better behave or
else, the promotion of the “human rights agenda” of the 1990s may be seen as the “good cop”
seeking to obtain the cooperation of the victimized citizens of the failed state in the formation of
an international community. On the face of it, these two claims might seem to share little in
common. Human rights, unlike the claim of a “democratic entitlement,” are a well-established
claim under international law. Although there are important arguments about the outer
boundaries of the scope of human rights, few people disagree about many of its core elements.
And yet the promotion of “international human rights” in the 1990s was influenced dramatically
by the same underlying force that fostered the articulation of a “democratic entitlement,” the
overwhelming and overweening power of the West.
There are, one might postulate, three stages in the effectuation of a legal rule. First, all
legal rules need specific and authoritative articulation. This is what Aristotle and his disciples –
notably Thomas Aquinas – called promulgation.47 Legal rules, then, are not left to the
imagination of the individual actor, but receive their force from the trans-subjective sanction they
receive from the community. Second, because most legal rules flow from the community and
therefore embody the values, interests, and power distributions within the community, they are
obeyed or complied with by the members of the community.48 Third, coercion is sometimes

47

See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, Part 1 of the Second Part, Q90, the Fourth Article (“In order
that that the law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law it must needs be applied to the men who have to
be ruled by it. Such application is made by it being notified to them by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is
necessary for the law to obtain its force.”).
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In fact, there is nothing distinctive about Professor Henkin’s statement on compliance by nations with
international law. It is the nature of all laws that most people (within the community) obey most of them most of the
time. A law that is routinely flouted no longer embodies the values, interests, or power distributions within the
community, and such a law, ordinarily, will be removed from the law books of the community. And there are, of
course, several other reasons why members of a community may comply with its laws. See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW

necessary to compel compliance.49 This is what we term enforcement,50 and its potential
availability is no doubt one of the contributing factors to compliance.51
Perhaps no other aspect of international law received as much publicization in the 1990s
as did “International Human Rights.” Despite the prolixity of writings on the subject, however,
the decade witnessed relatively little substantive development of the text of the law. About the
only authoritative promulgation of new law in the area related to the welfare of children.52 There
were, to be sure, vociferous debates among international publicists about the definition and scope
of international human rights laws, but virtually none of these debates led to any significant
authoritative changes in human rights law during the decade.53
While it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the level of voluntary compliance in the
1990s, there is little reason to believe that it was any less than it had been in prior decades, and
extrinsic evidence affords substantial grounds for suspecting that it was greater.54 Among other
NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY, 146-53 (2d ed. 1979).
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It is remarkable how this element of law has come to dominate much contemporary thinking about law. Thus, the
lucid writings of a well-known American scholar, Robert Cover, who coined the phrase “law as violence,” has been
influential among American academics. See generally ROBERT M. COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW
(Marha Minow et al. eds., 1997). And of course, much of legal positivism rests on Austin’s well-worn phrase that
“law is the command of the sovereign.” H.L.A. HART, CONCEPTS OF LAW (1997).
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In practice, enforcement may be subdivided into two phases: the authoritative pronouncement by a tribunal as to
whether conduct by a particular person constitutes a violation of law (the declaratory), and the exertion of the
compulsion necessary to effectuate the pronouncement (the implementation.) It is with the declaratory aspect of
enforcement that this essay focuses. It is also worth noting that this aspect of enforcement may also satisfy the
“promulgation” element of law, such as in those jurisdictions that follow the English common law practice. This
has certainly been the approach of some United States judges in developing customary international law. See, e.g.,
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Coercion, of course, is by no means the sole (or even primary) determinant of why actors comply with the law.
For a succinct enumeration of other considerations, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Theory of Customary
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999). The purpose of this essay, however, is not to explain why (or
even if) international law is obeyed. Rather, my interest is in elaborating why, within the international system,
certain conduct by certain actors at certain times may be considered lawful, while the same conduct by others at the
same, or other times, would be viewed as unlawful.
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See U.N. Convention on the Rights of Child G.A. res. 44/25, annex. 44 U.N.GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No.49, at
167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989). The assertion in the text is subject, however, to three caveats. First, it does not deny
that the reach of preexisting human rights law may have been expanded such as by the voluntary adoption and
ratification of treaties and protocols by states, or through authoritative judicial explications of preexisting laws. This
latter point will be discussed below in the context of enforcement. Second, contrary to the position of some
scholars, this writer does not view “international environmental law” – which did receive substantial development in
the 1990s – as a component of “human rights laws.” Finally, the writer does not subscribe to the view that academic
writings or the rhetorical assertions of policy-makers constitute authoritative promulgations of law.
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Strikingly, some of the innovations in thinking about human rights law were distinctly antithetical to the
“individual rights” orientation of the standard human rights norms. The protection of the “group,” especially
women and “indigenous peoples,” became the areas of primary interest. But even these areas did not result in any
substantive promulgations of new law.
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See Hans Otto-Sano and Lone Lindholt, Human Rights Indicators Country Data and Methodology 2000, DANISH
CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2000), available at
http://www.humanrights.dk/upload/application/bd50e713/indicator-full.pdf (last visited August 18, 2003).

factors, the number of governments that openly invited participation by the citizenry increased –
notably in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa. One might expect that this broadening of
civil and political participation rendered it more difficult for governments to arbitrarily deprive
their citizens of the usual freedoms one associates with the exercise of human rights. On the
other hand, the decade also witnessed remarkable instances of civil strife and wars which
resulted both in the weakening of state authority and significant population displacements. In the
Balkans, Middle-East, Central Asia, and Africa, these undoubtedly resulted in significant
atrocities and deprivations of human rights. And even in North America and Europe, the influx
of refugees (political and economic) led to the adoption of draconian and discriminatory
legislation with drastic consequences for the human rights of the immigrant.55 Whatever may
have been the level of compliance, however, it is clear that it was the product of political and
economic realities on the ground – much of it internal and particularistic – rather than the result
of any felt sense of obligation to abide by the norms of an international community.
It is in the area of enforcement that the international law of human rights came into its
own in the 1990s. Prior to that decade, international human rights laws were enforced through
the conventional approach. Although the benefits of the laws may have redounded to the
individual, the obligations were seen as undertaken by the national government, and any alleged
violations were remedied through assertions made against national governments, and typically by
other sovereigns.56 Moreover, the resolution of such claims was, in the first instance, assigned to
diplomatic and intergovernmental administrative bodies, and binding adjudication was deemed,
at most, as a last resort, and only in exceptional circumstances.57
Three fundamental shifts in focus in the 1990s dramatically realigned the enforcement
mechanism. First, individuals, as alleged victims of human rights violations, increasingly came
to be given direct roles in the enforcement process. Secondly, judicial tribunals, both national
and international, became enforcers of first instance. And, perhaps most dramatically,
individuals (either as agents of the state, or even as private actors), rather than the state itself,
were made directly answerable for claimed violations of international human rights law. Thus,
for example, United States courts asserted jurisdiction over civil actions brought by non-United
States persons against former officials of foreign governments for alleged violations of
international human rights laws that occurred exclusively within foreign territories.58 Similarly,
the United Kingdom House of Lords held that the former Chilean President, Augusto Pinochet,
could be arrested under British law and extradited to Spain for alleged crimes of torture in
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In the United States, for example, a 1996 legislation appeared to authorize the indefinite detention of an unwanted
immigrant if no other state would accept him. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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See Article 28 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 21, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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The complicated structure of human rights enforcement under the European Convention on Human Rights is
illustrative. See, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for
signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), Protocol 11 (1994). See generally
Nicolas Bratza and Michael O’Boyle, The Legacy of the Commission to the New Court Under the Protocol No. 11, 3
EUR. H.R. L.REV. 212 (1997).
58
See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980); In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); see
also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (wrestling with the problem of whether international human
rights law requires that the individual being sued have acted on behalf of a state).

Chile.59 Likewise, Belgian and Swiss trial courts have asserted authority to punish Rwandans
found within Belgium and Switzerland for conduct they undertook in Rwanda and which is said
to have violated international human rights law.60 The most significant change in international
human rights law, however, was the adoption in 1998 of the “Rome Treaty” which created a
permanent “international criminal Court” to try individuals accused of violating specified
international human rights laws, notably those relating to war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, and aggression.61 The Permanent International Criminal Court followed on the heels of
ad hoc tribunals that had been set up by the United Nations Security Council in response to the
massive perpetrations of atrocities in civil conflicts in Rwanda and the former Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia.62 These tribunals, together with those under contemplation for Sierra Leone and
Cambodia, make it evident that there is now an internationally accepted doctrine that sanctions
holding individuals directly responsible under international human rights law for conduct
deemed to be violative of that law.63
These developments have been lauded on several grounds. They are said to confer
“justice” because they remove “impunity” from the violations of international human rights law.
As such, they do not only provide recompense or vengeance for victims, but they may also deter
future violations.64 Moreover, these enforcement mechanisms permit judicial tribunals to
pronounce authoritatively on the scope and elements of human rights law, giving this aspect of
international law the more familiar obligatory characteristic of Leviathan’s legal rules. At the
same time, because individuals are made directly subject to international law, an “international
community” is fostered, and the power of the sovereign state as a necessary intermediary
between the individual and the international system is diminished correspondingly. The law of
rules, enforced by international jurists, one might say, thus replaces the rule of might enforced by
diplomats and generals. But the facts on the ground do not bear out these claims.
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See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 2000).
See, e.g., Niyonteze v. Public Prosecutor, Tribunal Militaire De Cassation (Switzerland, 2001), available at
<http://www.vbs.admin.ch/internet/OA/d/urteile.htm>, and summarized in Oxman and Reydams, International
Decision, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 231 (2002). A Belgian statute (“Act of June 16, 1993 regarding the punishment of
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention,” (translated in 38 I.L.M. 918), as amended in 1999), has been the source
of much academic scholarship, not least because Belgian prosecutors had employed the statute to go after persons
and events having no connection with Belgium. See generally Eva Brems, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction for
Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law: The Belgian Legislation, 6 SINGAPORE INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
909 (2002). As long as the Defendants were the inhabitants of the Third World side of the track, this assertion of
“universal jurisdiction” went not only essentially unchallenged, but was in fact lauded. However, as might be
expected, when it was sought to be applied to the likes of prime-Minister Sharon and President Bush, it was
promptly revised, and its reach curtailed. See, “Belgian premier denies genocide law changes due to US pressure,”
BBC Monitoring Service (June 23, 2003) 2003 WL 58742392.
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on July 17, 1998. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
183/9 at art.11 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
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S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR. 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR. 48TH
Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/808 (1993).
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But see Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Congo v. Belgium, (I.C.J. Feb. 14, 2002), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 536
(2002), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) (holding that Belgium
is without authority, under customary international law, to prosecute the former foreign minister of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo for conduct engaged in his official capacity, but declining to rule whether such a limitation
would apply to actions brought under conventional law such as the Rome Treaty).
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Kenneth Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in
Internal Conflicts, 93 AJIL 361 (1999).
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Preliminarily, it is worth observing that what constitutes “justice” is one of those openended debates that, while sometimes helpful in the clarification of specific points in the context
of an argument, is almost always utterly futile as a means for resolving issues of broad
application. It is conceivable that, for the narrow-minded Aristotelian for whom justice simply
means “one’s just desert,” holding individual actors directly responsible for violations of
international human rights is all that the term demands. For those who see international law as a
tool of system-wide regulation of conduct, then the idea of justice embodies more than the
immediate gratification of seeing wrongdoers receive their comeuppance.65 For this latter group,
the efficacy of the enforcement mechanism must be measured in terms of its consequences both
for the immediate victims of the violation and for the governance of the international system as a
whole. Here, even as one decries the egregiousness of international human rights violations,
note must be taken of the efficacy of an enforcement regime that seeks to “do justice” in fora that
are distant from where the wrongful acts occurred, and from which the victims and victimizers
alike are far removed.66 But, for the purposes of this essay, it is the injustice to the international
system, and more particularly to the operation of “law” within the system that the reader’s
attention needs to be drawn.
The focus in current international human rights law on the individual wrongdoer, rather
than on the state as actor, is generally portrayed as a progressive development of that law. That
it should be so viewed is remarkable; for, built into this view are two defeatist assumptions
which proponents of individualizing responsibility for the conduct of a state have not bothered to
explore. In the first place, this “progressive development” is not simply a confession of the
intractability of making states account directly for their behavior,67 but it reflects a willingness of
the system to throw up its hands on continuing to try to do so. It seeks to “declare victory” by
imposing liability on the weakest party to whom culpability can rationally be assigned. Consider
the following.
Invariably, the individual sought to be held responsible is a former official; a member of
the faction or cabal whose party is now not only out of power, but also discredited. In this light,
it is instructive that the International Court of Justice has held that a former minister, whose
government remains ready to go to bat on his behalf, is insulated from prosecution for alleged
violations of international human rights law, at least while he remains in office.68 Current
government officials thus are immunized from being made to account for violations of human
rights regardless of how egregious that conduct may be.69
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This debate is, of course, not unique to international law. Within the United States domestic policy arena, for
example, there has been in the last decade a similar philosophical disagreement between those who would “lock ‘em
up and throw away the keys,” on the one hand (the “three strikes you’re out” crowd), and those who see criminal
law as serving broader constituencies. See Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003). It need hardly be said that
the former group sees criminal policy entirely in terms of “them versus us.”
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INT’L L. 1069 (1999).
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President of the Republic of Liberia -- as a “war criminal” by the special court for Sierra Leone. See Liberia Leader
Wants Charge Lifted, BBC NEWS, June 12, 2003. In reality, however, Mr. Taylor, although duly elected as

In a similar vein, the former official who is to be made accountable typically hails from
or represents a weak member state of the international system. This officially sanctioned
inequality in the purported application of justice was glaringly in display in the debate over
United States ratification of the Rome Convention. What is striking is the extent to which all
participants in that debate not only recognized the political partiality of the criminal system there
created, but acquiesced and even gloried in that bias. Thus, the United States contended that as
the universal policeman, its citizens were entitled to total dispensation from prosecutions under
the Rome Convention.70 On the other hand, proponents of the Rome Convention argued against a
complete dispensation for United States citizens primarily on the ground that such a facially
obvious double-standard was not necessary because it was already embodied – albeit less
transparently – within the interstices of the treaty. In support of this proposition they advanced
two illuminating arguments. In the first place, the prosecutorial decision-making process assured
the discriminating application of the terms of the Treaty. The decision to prosecute was to be
made either by a politically-appointed Chief Prosecutor, or by the Security Council, whose vote
in the matter was nonprocedural, thereby empowering any of the five permanent members to
block an undesired prosecution.71 As experience over the disposition of the charge of war crimes
in the Kosovo crisis showed, it would be a remarkable Chief Prosecutor who would be daring
enough to lay charges against citizens of a victorious army.72 In the second place, the doctrine of
“complementarity”73provided the United States – and, indeed, any other powerful society willing
and shameless enough to employ it – an effectively unreviewable mechanism for insulating its
nationals from the reach of international criminal prosecutions under the Rome treaty.74
President in an election generally acknowledged to have been “free and fair,” had been, for sometime prior to his
indictment, treated as a “pariah.” Specifically, his government had been laboring under a remarkable, if not unique,
regime of economic and military sanctions imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations. He was thus
already a persona non grata, comparable only perhaps to Mr. Saddam Hussein, the U.S.-deposed President of Iraq.
See Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Office of the Prosecutor: Deputy Director Expresses Anger at
Taylor’s “Pariah Regime” (Freetown, May 22, 2003).
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http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2002/020506/epf107.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
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against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (June 2000) (prosecutor’s report, declining to bring charges of war
crimes for the NATO bombing of civilians and civilian infrastructures in Serbia during the Kosovo war), available
at http://www.un.org/itcy/pressreal/nato061300.htm.
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See Rome Statute, Art. 1, providing that assertion of jurisdiction by the ICC shall be “complementary” to
prosecutions under national criminal prosecutions. Presumably, this does not exempt from international prosecution
persons who have sought to create domestic peace and tranquility by owning up to past wrongs and seeking (or
indeed obtaining immunity within national jurisdictions) for those wrongs.
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One aspect of the argument over whether Ariel Sharon, the current Prime Minister of Israel, should be prosecuted
for war crimes allegedly committed while he was Defense Minister during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982
sheds an interesting light on the doctrine of complementarity. As is well known, there was the killing of substantial
numbers of Palestinians in the Beirut refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. Although these camps were surrounded
by Israeli soldiers, it is generally accepted that the killings were perpetrated by Lebanese Christians. The precise
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Government Inquiry Commission investigated these issues and, while not holding Mr. Sharon criminally responsible
for the massacres, questioned his leadership of the Israeli army during the course of events in Beirut. Does the work

Conclusively demonstrating that the concern of many proponents of the Rome Treaty was not
about the double-standard built into the treaty, many signatory states have, since the refusal of
the United States to sign unto the treaty, nonetheless agreed not to hand over to the International
Criminal Court United States nationals charged with human rights violations, even if they are
found within the signatory state.75 Nor, apparently, is the invocation of a double standard limited
to the United States. NATO members, many of them ratifiers of the Rome Treaty, appear
perfectly willing to invoke the same immunity for their military personnel serving in
Afghanistan.76
But beyond abstractions about rules of justice, “the taste of the pudding,” as the adage
goes, “is in the eating.” International Human Rights Law, in the 1990s, became a favorite of
International Law scholars in the West and, by extension, their students. For reasons that I have
already provided, this new-found favor cannot be attributed to any fundamental change in the
jurisprudence or text of the law, nor to increased incidents of compliance or derogations from it.
Rather, it was the willingness of domestic court judges in the West to interpret and apply this law
to individual conduct that generated the new interest and enthusiasm.77 Judicial enforcement of
international human rights law “empowered” Western academic scholars and activists in two
distinctive ways. First, a body of doctrine was being generated. This is familiar fare for
scholarship. Scholars could now write seemingly disinterested articles and invoke “case law” in
support of apparently “neutral” and/or “universal” propositions. Because it was “the law,” there
was no longer any need to try to legitimize the propositions through jurisprudential investigation
of first principles. Secondly, this “law” could be deployed in pressuring the political branches of
government to adopt particular policies favored by the scholars and activists and, indeed, to
promulgate new laws and policies that were seen to be consonant with the “law.”78
Ordinarily, there is nothing wrong in the development of the law through judicial
enforcement. Indeed, this sort of “progressive development” of the law is often a normative
good. Similarly, there is nothing necessarily illegitimate in deploying judicial decisions for the
two purposes described above. These understandings make sense, however, only if one sees the
judicial enforcement of law as the evenhanded and principled application of doctrine within its
appropriate sphere, the “community” of the regulated. That has not been the history of the
of this Commission meet the requirement of complementarity? Some have asserted that it does. Todd M. Sailer, The
International Criminal Court: An Argument to Extend Its Jurisdiction to Terrorism and a Dismissal of US
Objections, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP LJ 311, Fall 1999.
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See, e.g., Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Assistance force and the Interim
Administration of Afghanistan, Annex A Paragraph 4, available at http://www.operations.mod.uk/isafmta.pdf (last
visited Nov. 19, 2003). Indeed, the Security Council has endorsed the granting of immunity from prosecutions
under the Rome Convention to soldiers purportedly serving as “peace keepers.” See Security Council Resolution
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I have explored, elsewhere, the role of the domestic courts of the United States in shaping the development of
international human rights law. See Chibundu, “Making Customary International Law,” supra note __.
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Thus in the United States, for example, judicial rulings construing violations of international human rights law as
giving rise to legal claims under the “Alien Tort Claims Act” (see 28 U.S.C. 1350) were invoked by the United
States Congress in adopting the “Torture Victims’ Protection Act,” 28 U.S.C. 1350N.

judicial enforcement of international human rights law in the West, nor of its use by Western
politicians.
As I have already indicated, one of the disenchanting experiences with the demands for
and use of judicial enforcement of international human rights law is that its application has been
limited to former government officials of disfavored societies. If, in fact, this selective
application of law were justifiable on legal grounds, this shortcoming would not necessarily be
disabling. But the selectivity, unequivocally and demonstrably, is shaped by power politics. The
judicial enforcement of international human rights law, in other words, plainly subverts the view
that the “rule of law” speaks truth to power. To the contrary, it is used to reinforce the disparate
treatment accorded claimed violations by Western societies vis-à-vis those of non-Western
societies. Here are a few examples:
In Afghanistan, there have been several reports of indiscriminate bombings leading to the
deaths of several civilians.79 There have also been stories in which United States personnel, if not
actively complicitous with local Afghanis, have at least stood by while elements of the victorious
“Northern coalition Army” in Afghanistan herded defeated Taliban soldiers and supporters into
sealed trucks only to have those persons suffocate to death and be buried in mass graves.80 Yet,
there has been scarcely a murmur that such conduct should be subject to criminal investigation.
Rather, as in the former Yugoslavia, their veracity is either challenged, or grudgingly admitted
and then dismissed as “collateral damage.” Nor is it surprising that the one instance in which
criminal charges have been brought against United States soldiers for their conduct in
Afghanistan involved a so-called “friendly fire” incident in which Canadian soldiers were
accidentally killed by errant bombing.81
Nor is U.S. unwillingness to subject its soldiers to prosecutions for war crimes unique.
Neither the Belgians in Rwanda, nor the Italians in Somalia, despite stories of human rights
violations by their “peacekeepers,” subjected any of their citizens to criminal prosecution.82
And, it is apparently the case that U.N. peacekeepers, when they are accused of wrongful acts
whether in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone or East Timor, are simply “shipped back home.”83 By
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contrast, when the Russians put on trial one of their soldiers for the violation of the human rights
of a Chechnyan, the argument revolves not around the message being sent, but the shortcomings
of the prosecution.84
As in other aspects of International Law, the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis
over control of territories west of the Jordan river has generated substantial challenges to
international human rights law. As has been the case elsewhere in international law, human
rights law has failed the challenge – at least if an essential element of that challenge is fairness
and evenhandedness of application. The place of terror in waging war is one of the significant
sources of controversy that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has brought to the forefront of
discussion. The United States Congress and courts have been unequivocal in the positions that
they have adopted. In a series of legislation spurred substantially by the death of U.S. nationals
in terrorist attacks related to the conflict, the Congress has required the Executive Branch to
designate “state sponsors of terrorism,”85 and “terrorist organizations”86and it has authorized
civil suits against such states, and the prosecution of members of such organizations, or any
persons who furnish assistance to such organizations. United States courts and the United States
Department of Justice have moved vigorously to enforce these laws.87 Unsurprisingly, those
who have been caught up in the net of these prosecutions invariably have been opposed to Israel.
But here again, the United States is by no means alone in its condemnation of anti-Israeli terror.
It can fairly be said that insistence on the condemnation and punishment of such bombings by the
Palestinian Authority, and more particularly by its leader, Yasir Arafat, has become an obligatory
component of international politics.
But the indifferent killing of civilians and other noncombatants in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict is not the preserve of Palestinians and their supporters. By any calculation, for each
Israeli civilian that has been killed in a terror attack, three to four Palestinian civilians have been
killed by Israeli government action.88 It is not fashionable to call such action “terrorism,”89 but
its Mission in Kosovo, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1291 (2003). The issue posed in the text is not whether these
peacekeepers are guilty, but rather that the structure for determining their guilt or innocence is far from transparent
and is, in fact, skewed to avoid accountability by the powerful.
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the wantonness and abandon with which Israel has conducted its reprisals and “preventive” raids
in crowded urban centers and refugee camps90 render the semantic distinctions transparently
hypocritical. But significantly, unlike the broad and near-universal condemnation which
Palestinian suicide bombings rightfully have generated, the response of the “international
community” to Israeli government callousness has been, to put it charitably, timid.91 Thus, when
in April 2002, there was no doubt that a large number of civilian noncombatants had been killed
during the Israeli occupation of the Janine Refugee camp, the “international community” not
only backed down on investigating the circumstances under which those persons were killed,92
but remarkably, the seminal issue became the thoroughly vapid one of whether the killing of at
least 27 persons should be termed a “massacre.”93 In the one instance in which the killing of a
British national was sufficiently weighty to draw the attention of the Security Council, a
resolution of condemnation was promptly vetoed by the United States.94
That Iraqi civilians (and particularly children) were the primary victims of the twelveyear imposition of sanctions on Iraq is beyond dispute.95 While the West and the “international
community” wipe their hands of these consequences on the ground that the Iraqi leadership must
take responsibility for its obduracy in defying the “international community,” it is striking that
powerful members of this “community” not only threatened the potential prosecution of
members of the Iraqi government for human rights violations, but they were willing to forego
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such prosecutions if forbearance would secure “regime change.”96
Few events have offered a better opportunity for observing the correlation of principle
and politics in the application of international human rights law than the capture of Mr. Saddam
Hussein and the debate over the forum in which he should be prosecuted. And just as the waging
of war against his government has laid bare the flimsiness of a principled application of the
doctrinal prohibition of the use of force in international relations,97 the lineup in the debate over
his trial has shredded whatever remaining belief one might have in the promotion of human
rights as a principled undertaking. The basic question has been who ought to try Mr. Hussein for
his alleged sins. Four fora have been suggested: The United States as the controlling power in
Iraq, the interim “Iraqi Governing Council” (presumably representing Iraqi society), a fullfledged international tribunal, and “a mixed tribunal” of Iraqis and the “international
community.” The first, with virtual unanimity, has been rejected out of hand for approximating
reality too closely.98 The first option, that the US try Mr. Hussein, would all-too-blatantly
acknowledge what is otherwise obvious: that much of what passes for “international justice” is
little more than the act of victors getting to try the vanquished. And so the debate, at least within
the circle of the so-called international human rights groups, has focused around the other three
options.99 That the last two fora should have the support of the human rights groups is to be
expected. What is surprising is not simply that trial by an Iraqi national court has not only been
contemplated, but the language in which it has been couched and defended by some of its
proponents. And so, an academic who advocated as a “badge of honor” the trial in U.S. courts of
foreigners for human rights violations occurring entirely outside of the United States,100 now
argues that it would be “paternalistic” for Mr. Hussein to be tried in a judicial forum composed
by other than Iraqis.101 And, another academic, who had contended that Augusto Pinochet
should be extradited to Spain because Chileans could not be trusted to try him,102 now even more
fiercely defends the propriety of Mr. Hussein being tried by Iraqis.103 If these positions indeed
represent a change of heart to embrace the view that the enforcement of human rights, however
universal the idea, if it is to transcend a transient manifestation of Western power, must be
embedded in the particularized practices and institutions of the local non-Western community,
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then this writer welcomes such change.104 But that such a change of philosophy is afoot is highly
doubtful. It is difficult to see how this endorsement of the Iraqi national tribunal, at least as
currently constituted, can be squared with the fundamentalist belief in principles of “liberal
democracy” or impartial justice that Western academics routinely chant as the determinants of
the legitimacy of a tribunal that is asked to sit in judgment over alleged war criminals.105 It may
be that some will view as overly skeptical the suggestion that the only rationale for the
acceptability of the Iraqi judicial system is that it is simply a thinly veiled stand-in for the reality
of U.S. military control. As such, the first two options are different only to the extent that the
second is a better mask of the reality of power than the first.106 But if so, As Susan Sontag has
observed: “[t]he writer in me distrusts the good citizen, the "intellectual ambassador," the human
rights activist . . . much as I am committed to them.”107
One last example illustrates the likely future (and certainly the past) shape of the judicial
enforcement of international human rights law. Recently, members of a rebel movement in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo were alleged to have engaged in human rights violations,
including torture, rape, and cannibalism. The leadership of the rebel movement put some of its
soldiers on trial for torture and rape. This action, however, was decried by the leadership of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, which stated that it would be instituting an action against the
rebel movement in the International Criminal Court.108 And so, we may expect that the ICC will
become another institution that will preside exclusively over purely third-world conflicts, while
being essentially irrelevant in affording protection or succor to Third World victims of inhumane
treatment in the West.109
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In summary, the new human rights law, framed as the enforcement through judicial
means of “universal norms,” amounts to little more than an insistence that the West – ably aided,
of course, by a cadre of non-Western jurists – apply its new found supremacy to impose judicial
sanctions on violators of human rights law. Significantly, this judicial enforcement of law has
turned the law of international human rights on its head. Rather than enforcing claims against
states, judicial enforcement has become a tool by which state responsibility is buried in the
sophistry of going against former government officials or rebellious persons. And this
subversion of the idea of human rights has been perpetrated and defended in the name of calling
sovereignty to account to the individual. The result is that the doctrine of “sovereignty” remains
entirely available to Western societies as they exclude immigrants from entry and participation,
but thoroughly undermined in the relationships that rulers have to the ruled in non-Western
societies. George Orwell could not have been half as prescient on the uses of double-speak.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A. The rise, Fall, and Re-orchestration of a Liberal International Order
Along with the prohibition of the use of force and the protection of human rights, the
internationalization of programs for the promotion of economic progress was a third fundamental
innovation of the world order that emerged following World War II. Initially the institutions and
regimes that were created in furtherance of this objective responded primarily to the needs of the
West.110 The international monetary system, coordinated and managed under the auspices of the
International Monetary Fund, thus focused primarily on the maintenance of stable – indeed fixed
– exchange rates among Western currencies. The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (the “World Bank”) was intended to finance the reconstruction of war-damaged
Europe, but much of this work – at least with regard to Western Europe – in the initial years
following World War II was undertaken through the parallel institution of the “Marshall Plan.”
The result was that the World Bank, until the revolutionary changes of the International
Economic Order in the late 1960s and 1970s, remained a peripheral actor. The third player in the
post-World War II international economic order was the “General Agreements on Tariffs and
Trade.” The Orphan of a stillborn parent – the International Trade Organization – GATT had as
its primary objective the promotion of trade among Western societies through tariff reductions
on manufactures. Conspicuously left out was the reduction of tariffs on agricultural products.
The booming success of the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan, the
comparative impoverishment of Latin America and much of Asia, and the decolonization of
Africa and a good part of Asia resulted in challenges, at least by the second-half of the 1960s, in
the fit between the objectives of these institutions and their constituencies. The activism in the
international arena of the Latin American and newly independent Afro-Asian states, herded
under the umbrella of the “nonaligned movement,” forced a restructuring of the international
economic order. Ruthlessly exploiting the geopolitics of the Cold War these “nonaligned” states
collaborated in the 1960s and 1970s to extract significant concessions from the industrialized
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West. Skillfully wielding doctrines of state sovereignty and juristic equality, as well as nascent
economic power flowing from raw material shortages, they wrangled from the West grudging
acceptance of changes in international norms relating to such fundamental concepts as
consistency in the application of GATT’s most favored nation principle, 111 the ability of states to
rewrite concession agreements, and the right of the state to nationalize foreign-owned property.
And, ruthlessly exploiting the West’s own rhetoric of “democracy” and “egalitarianism” which
had come to be embedded as norms of the international legal order,112developing societies
pushed for an entirely “New International Economic Order.”113 They insisted on “national
sovereignty” over their natural resources, complete control over foreign investments within their
economies, and the right to determine for themselves the terms under which they would engage
in economic relations with others.114 In exchange for these rights, they merely agreed to abide
by “general principles of international law”; principles that they would themselves develop
through United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and Declarations.
The West, of course, did not sit idly by.115 While it responded in part through such
institutions as theG7,116 the more significant and ultimately lasting response was ideological. It
took sometime coming, but by 1981, with the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom in 1979, and Ronald Reagan as President of the United States a year later,
the neoconservative response was in place.
Neo-conservatism, succinctly put, is a reaction to the perception that the “liberalism” of
the West in the post-World War II era was “soft.” The West’s mettle needed to be hardened.
While in the foreign policy and foreign relations arenas the ideology is more commonly
111
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associated with the Cold War conflict,117 it was no less influential in dictating the international
economic policies of the West in the 1980s, especially those of the United States and the United
Kingdom. In the first place, neo-conservatism required domestic economic policies that tamed
the demands of left-of-center groups, such as labor unions and supporters of the welfare state.
Instinctively, neoconservatives viewed developing societies much the same way in which they
viewed these domestic constituencies. They were leeches on hard-working societies. Secondly,
the arguments against “big government” and “big spending” (exempting, of course, law
enforcement and “national defense“) framed in response to the claims of the domestic
constituencies translated all-too-well in the international arena. Here, for neoconservatives,
foreign aid policies whether undertaken by national governments, the World Bank, or the IMF,
were to be discouraged. International trade was to be conducted, as much as practicable, on a
laissez-faire basis; and governmental policies should avoid, as much as possible, impeding the
trans-border flow of private capital. The privatization of economies thus became a rallying cry
of neoconservatives. Thirdly, the realization of the objectives of the preceding two sets of
policies depended on the government acting forcefully and vigorously in the economic arena to
maintain a strong national currency. Not surprisingly, then, both the United States and British
governments went out of their way to maintain a “strong” dollar and a “strong” pound.118
These were the ideological prescriptions of neo-conservatism and, for the most part, they
were also practical policies. Reality occasionally dictated deviations from these orthodoxies.
Thus, President Reagan, in order to soften the sledge-hammer effects of his anti-Communist
policies in Central America, embarked on the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which extended United
States trade to Caribbean and Central American countries on highly preferential terms.119 But
these were rare exceptions and, in fact, highlighted the core attribute of the neoconservative
approach to international economic relations; namely, that international economics and
international politics are completely intertwined and serve the same interest, the “national”
interest. Economic relations among states, like politics, in the view of neo-conservatism, is
essentially conflictual. The allocation of interests among participants is dictated by the
possession of and capacity to apply power resolutely. In this scheme, international institutions
play secondary and marginal roles.
The free fall of the price of crude oil in the second-half of the 1980s, and the concurrent
appreciation of the U.S. Dollar, seemed to validate the neoconservative approach. By the end of
the decade the United States in particular, and the West, generally, was in a much better
economic position, both relatively and absolutely than it had been at its beginning. Moreover, in
the most profound economic crisis of the decade – the “debt crisis” – it was the actions of the
United States government, not those of the various international institutions that were central to
its management and resolution. And, as for international trade, the one area where international
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cooperation was still ballyhooed, the dominant principles of the “Uruguay round” were those put
forward by the Neoconservative United States Administrations of Ronald Reagan and George
Bush. In particular, the tentacles of the international trading regime began reaching out to
substantively regulate intellectual property rights.120
This then was the setting for the international economic order that emerged in the 1990s.
Like the political order, it was shaped and nurtured not by abstract concepts of “right principles,”
but by the realities of power. This new economic order was thus subject to the same forces that
dictated the “new world order” of the 1990s. The United States did not merely possess dominant
power, but that power was viewed as the natural consequence of a virtuous and “indispensable”
society. The United States did not act for itself, but for all of humanity. Above all, the success
of the United States, and of the West, demonstrated beyond cavil the supreme correctness of the
underlying belief systems and institutions.
B. The Neoliberal Order of the 1990s
By one of those quirks of history, at just about the time that the successes of neoconservatism seemed indisputable, its primary proponents (the Reagan-Bush and Thatcher
governments in the United States and United Kingdom, respectively) lost political power. They
were succeeded by disciples of what came to be known as “the third way.”121 These epigones of
neo-conservatism, while implementing policies that, in practical terms, were indistinguishable
from those of neoconservatives, effectively co-opted international institutions into the process,
and generated what came to be known as “neoliberal” economics. Two pillars of this new order
illustrate its correlation with the “new world order” of the political arena of the 1990s, and its
departure from the post-World War II “Liberal Order.” These pillars preached the gospels of
“structural adjustment” and of “privatization.” Both had their genesis in the ideologies of neoconservatism, but their prostyltization and ultimate domination of the globe would not have been
possible without neoliberalism’s efficacious deployment of the triarchy of post-World War II
“Bretton-Woods” institutions.
Structural Adjustment Programs were pioneered by the IMF and the World Bank in the
1980s. These financial institutions, having essentially been relegated to the backwaters of
international economic relations by neoconservative governments, sought to make themselves of
continuing relevance by insisting that their developing country wards ape the ideas and practices
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of neo-conservatism. Thus, as a condition for lending to these countries, the IMF and the World
Bank insisted not simply on the standard covenants, guarantees, and pledges of repayment or a
showing of the capacity to repay, but on wholesale restructuring of national economic policies
with their attendant social and political consequences.122 Developing country governments
seeking financial support from these institutions were frequently obligated to undertake farreaching reforms in such disparate areas as limitations on governmental expenditures, the size of
the civil service, subsidization of imports, tax and tariff-collection mechanisms, the use of price
controls, interest rate policies, and inflationary measures. These undertakings were then
subjected to periodic reviews with the draw-downs on tranches of existing loans and access to
future potential borrowings being dependent on prior performance.
These policies and practices were carried through into the 1990s. There were, to be sure,
changes at the margins to take account of the strong criticisms to which structural adjustment
programs were subjected, and which reflected the increased ascendancy of the World Bank over
the IMF as the preferred tool in dealings between the West and the “developing world.”
Nonetheless, in its essence, the neoliberal international economic order of the 1990s was based
as much on a notion of subordinating the national economic policies of developing societies to
the strictures of a standardized Western-determined set of economic objectives as had the neoconservatism of the 1980s. Indeed, in some ways, neoliberal economic prescriptions, if
anything, tended to be more intrusive. Driven by much of the same zeitgeist that undergirded the
international human rights movement, Western proponents of the need to protect the
environment and of the rights of women, ruthlessly employed their governments’ control of the
World Bank as a tool to force changes in the policies of the developing world on these issues.
Similarly, economic interests in the West readily exploited the negotiations of the World Trade
Organization – as successor to the GATT – to impose substantive changes in the policies of
developing countries in such areas as the protection of intellectual property and so-called “trade
related investment measures.”123
The emergence of “privatization” as the dominant economic prescription of the West to
the rest of the world in the 1990s aptly ties up the interrelatedness of the dominance of Western
military and political power in the 1990s and its use in the economic arena. Neo-conservatism
had preached the reduction of government involvement in the economic life of societies. By and
large, however, the ideology was only minimally translated into action. Even in the United
Kingdom, where Margaret Thatcher vigorously sought to undo decades of Labor Party
nationalizations, there remained in government hands at the time that she left office substantial
chunks of the British economy that might otherwise have been expected to be privately
controlled. The 1990s, by contrast, witnessed not only massive privatizations within domestic
economies in the West, but the espousal of privatization as an international dogma.
Whatever else may be said for or against neo-conservatism, its philosophical embrace of
privatization was normative.124 Deregulation and privatization were seen as social goods.
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Whether or how those policies got implemented were essentially the concerns of individual
societies. By contrast, neo-liberals, much like their international human rights cohorts, came to
see in privatization a panacea for the ills of the developing world. Whether Western societies
implemented or shrank from privatization – nor the reasons why they did so – was not the point.
The successful free market capitalism of the West, grounded as it is on the private ownership,
control, and management of capital, when contrasted with the failure of the Communist
experimentation – a failure no longer in doubt by 1989 – is all the proof required. It became
standard international economic doctrine that societies seeking access to international finance
must privatize their economies or forego such assistance, and thus emerged the so-called
“Washington consensus” which was pushed actively by the international financial institutions,
notably the World Bank and the IMF.125
As was the case with the doctrines relating to the “use of force” and “international human
rights,” the Washington Consensus was presented in humanistic grounds, but such velvety gloss
could not quite mask the potential rusts at the core, and the necessities of an iron fist to maintain
its outward serenity. Economic Crises in Mexico in 1994-95, South-East Asia in 1997, Russia in
1998, Argentina in 2001, and Brazil in 2002, have challenged the stability of the underlying
wisdom of the Consensus.126 How effectively the international economic edifice can continue to
withstand these challenges, of course, is subject to divergent speculative inquiries, but what
seems obvious is that the outcome cannot be dissociated from the continuing exercise of military
and political power by the West, generally, and the United States in particular.127 The
unfortunate reality is that, in the economic arena, no less than in the human rights area,
proponents of universalism have relied not on the spontaneous convergence of beliefs derived
from the internal demands and dynamics of societies, but on the compelled imposition of
Western ideas deemed to be of universal human benefit. These ideas, once framed as “legal” are
then presented as essentially unimpeachable.128 In the next part of this essay, I shall challenge
this methodology by exploring in normative terms the relationship of the ideas of power, law,
community, and the outsider.
IV. THE IDEOLOGIES OF INT’L LAW AND INT’L COMMUNITY
Thus far this essay has presented a description of the interaction of law, politics, and
economics in the international system in jurisprudentially unproblematic terms. Law, it has
assumed, is constituted of rules and standards. To be sure, the parties may disagree about the
coercing others to adopt it. Of course, this did not rule out the use of incentives and disincentives in getting other
countries to follow suit.
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specifics of particular rules or standards, but they do not doubt the possibility of generating such
rules, and that once generated, rules and standards become authoritative and binding on the
parties. Similarly, the essay thus far has taken as a given that there is indeed an international
order or system; that is, an autonomously functioning regime of predictable rules and principles
recognized and accepted as such. For most of international legal scholarship, the acceptance of
these conditions is not only axiomatic, but conclusive. So, to the extent what has been written
thus far merits debate within international legal scholarship, that debate would almost always be
framed simply in terms of the accuracy of the description thus provided, or perhaps the error of
the interpretation assigned a particular description. This part of the essay seeks to go beyond
factual and comparative descriptions in order to lay bare the foundations that shape the
approaches to and conceptions of international law as a distinctively recognizable regime of
rules, norms, and practices. This excavation of foundations that are not usually inquired into, but
are almost always taken as given, is guided by the belief that in order to understand the legal
treatment of the “other” within the international order, it is helpful to understand the role law
plays in the construction and definition of a community. Hence, the need to take a break from
description to adumbrate underpinning normative notions of law and the community. This
articulation will also be helpful in explaining the evaluations of the future of the international
legal order with which this essay shall conclude.
A. Concepts of Law in the International Legal Order
Many brilliant minds have given attention to the problems posed in defining the concept
of law, and it is not the object of this essay to rehearse the varied answers that have been
given, let alone to try to improve on them. Two concepts of particular relevance to the
undertakings of this essay, however, seem inescapable from the multiplicity of jurisprudential
writings on law. First, law is a distinctive social institution inasmuch as it binds all who fall
within its sway. To assert that something is “law,” is therefore to demand compliance.
Individual preferences are irrelevant.130 The regulated cannot choose whether to be bound.
Second, and a point that reinforces the first, the efficacy of law derives from the fact that it is
backed up by the community. The nature of the community differs, ranging for example from
129
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This idea is best captured by John Austin’s definition of law as “the command of the sovereign.” This is, of
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Aristotle’s Greek “city-state” which explicitly excluded slaves from membership and therefore
the burdens of legal obligation, to Kant’s “community of liberal states for perpetual peace”
which aimed for the inclusiveness and toleration of religiously diverse societies. As Thomas
Aquinas rightly recognized when he classified law in terms of the sources of the authority that
mandated obedience, a person belongs to several communities, and each community is entitled to
demand obedience. And, this recognition is at the core of contemporary theories on how to
reconcile the “individual” with the “citizen” in a heterodox multicultural liberal state.131
Similarly, the means by which enforcement is backed up depends on the nature of the
community within which law operates. Thus, in the quintessential modern community, the state,
police power ultimately lies at the heart of enforcement, expressed as often as not through the
use (or threat of use) of force by the state on behalf of its members against a wrongdoer.132
Other societies, however, have sought enforcement through other mechanisms. For example, in
the Greek city-state, “Atimia,” the withdrawal of communal protection from the wrongdoer by
declining to prevent or prosecute the private use of violence against him was an accepted form of
punishment;133 while in the Catholic church excommunication from the community of those
entitled to partake in the Eucharist was the ultimate sanction. And, of course, enforcement can
be implemented through less punitive measures, whether physical or moral. Hence, in an
environment in which “money” is the measure of one’s value, it is hardly surprising that
imposition of financial costs may be just as effective in compelling compliance as moral
damnation may have been in a religious environment. Finally, ostracism through imprisonment
continues to be a dominant mode of enforcing laws in our time.
Speaking about law without reference to the community in which it functions is,
therefore, not a particularly useful undertaking.134 And, the transcendence of community in an
understanding of law applies regardless of whether one subscribes to a positivist or a natural law
conception of the proper basis for determining the source of law. In what follows, then, I shall
first elaborate on the implications of these two conceptions of the idea of law for the “rule of
law” within international society, and then develop the relevance of the conception of law for an
understanding of international society as constituting a “community.”
1. The Binding Force of International Law
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Early proponents of the “rule of law,” such as Albert Venne-Dicey, recognized this reality. For Venne-Dicey, for
example, the “rule of law” was not simply about the existence of law in general, but related to the mechanisms by
which each society generated, interpreted, and enforced those laws. Thus, the “rule of law” in England was a
distinctly different phenomenon from the operation of law in France.

Until quite recently, it was not unfashionable – even among very well informed and
thoughtful persons – to doubt whether there is, in fact, such a thing as “international law.”135 At
the core of that doubt was the perceived deficiency of the system to enforce its own rules. And
without enforcement (or at least the capacity) by the lawgiver, there could be no law.
Proponents of the existence of international law responded to this challenge in three
ways. First, the least surefooted of the group argued that international law was a different kind
of a legal regime. Like national law, it possessed “hard law” which can and are enforced through
such recognizably judicial institutions as arbitral tribunals and the International Court of Justice.
But, unlike national law, international law was also to be found in “soft law.” This latter “law”
was to be found in hortatory statements, guidelines, codes of conduct or behavior, and like
norms. These were law despite the absence of any enforcement mechanism because they are
expressive of important international values that cut across cultures and political divides.136 A
second group forthrightly challenged the notion that actual enforcement is a necessary element of
the definition of law. For this group, what matters is whether those persons whom a law purports
to regulate view their conduct as constrained by the law. This sense of “compliance” is what
distinguishes the legal from the merely moral. As long as nation states in the international
system accept that their conduct is constrained by legal rules, it is not essential that there actually
be automatic enforcement of rules when they’re occasionally violated.137 The third school of
thought is represented primarily by the proponents of international human rights who dominated
the intellectual articulation of international law norms in the 1990s.138 Essentially, this group
sought to make international law more like domestic law by co-opting domestic enforcement
institutions into the international law arena. But, as I have explained, this co-optation has been at
the cost of shifting the focus of international law away from state compliance to the punishment
of individuals.139
One of the consequences of the shift in international power indisputably to the West in
the 1980s and 1990s is that it has permitted the West to institutionalize its chosen norms and
enforcement mechanisms so that today no one seriously questions whether international law is
indeed law, nor even its source or legitimation.140 Rather, the focus has turned to mundane
questions of interpretation. That shift has been accomplished primarily because the unrivaled
accumulation and use of global economic military and cultural power in the United States, in
particular, and the West, generally, has been conflated into and confused with the idea of a
global or “international” community. The operative assumption appears to be that because
particular norms and rules can be transmitted and effectively enforced without regard to
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territorial boundaries, all who are made subject to such norms must constitute a “community.”
What is striking is that while proponents of this construction of the relationship of international
law to an international community speak in terms of a “Grotian moment,” the underlying ethos is
essentially Austinian. 141 It is apparently the effective enforcement of law that creates the
community, not the community that creates law. And here lies one of the paradoxes of the
relationship of law to community whose understanding deserves some attention.
It is possible to view law as produced by a community, or a community as the product of
law. In the first, law derives its effectiveness from the voluntary compliance of the members of
the community. Compliance flows from the fact that the law is the articulation of shared norms
and values. In such a setting, the smaller or more insular the community is, the more likely it is
that laws, habits, and morals will approximate each other, and may become indistinguishable.142
This is particularly so in affective communities.143 In larger communities, however, where the
primary thrust of community formation is functional, the voluntary acceptance of law has to be
shaped by factors other than affective ties. Socially ingrained norms and habits, whether
imparted through indoctrination or rooted in the inertia of the subject, go some way in explaining
acceptance under these circumstances. But no less crucial are those processes and institutions by
which law, in all but the most primordial of communities, gets generated, adopted, interpreted,
and enforced. These processes or institutions, which H.L.A. Hart has termed “secondary rules of
recognition,”144 themselves constructively reflect and embody the shared norms and values of the
community. To be sure, the larger or more complex the community, the more difficult it is to
trace the law to its voluntary acceptance by the community, and the processes and institutions
now seem to take on a life of their own, independent of the community or its social norms. The
idea that law, in this setting, is based on the voluntary compliance of the members of the
community becomes notional. Law, as the construction of the community can thus get turned
around into the community being the construct of law.
There is of course another way in which law can be made binding. Compliance can be
coerced. The quintessential illustration is where an edict of the master is enforced against the
slave. But it would be a perversion of the term “community” to think of the master and the slave
as living in a single “community.” It is the master that makes the law and enforces it against the
slave. The law is that of the master, not of the community. And what is true about the masterslave relationship applies just as readily in all situations in which law is imposed on the basis of
the mastery of the one and the subjugation of the other.
2. International Law and International Community
Clearly, there is an aspect in which the operation of international law fits within the
notion of law as the product of the community. Much of international law, especially but by no
means exclusively treaty-based international law, can be and is legitimated as the product of the
community of states. Customary international law, traditionally understood as those practices of
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states backed by “opinio juris” can also be readily rationalized as being derived from or
effectuated within communal norms, institutions and processes. The relevant community, of
course, being that of states.
It is increasingly fashionable, however, to posit international law as operating not simply
within a community of states, but among peoples. All of humanity, it is said, form a single
community. As such, they may create international law directly, and international law may
operate directly on them. In this setting, state consent and practice are not themselves the
sources of law, but merely the proof or affirmation of such law. And such consent or practice
can be dispensed with when they stand as inconvenient obstacles to the realization of higher
norms. International Human Rights Law, and the idea of “jus cogens” typically are platforms
employed to present this vision of the operation of law in a transcendent community of peoples
rather than of states.
If indeed the peoples of the world are responsible for generating international law norms,
then the direct application of international legal norms to them would be consistent with the
principle that the binding force of law derives from its legitimation through consent, whether
constructively implied or directly given. Under classical international law, this fiction worked
itself through the presumed representative capacity of the nation state. When the state entered
into a treaty, it was conveying the consent of those who constituted it and whose interests it
represented. The obligations that it therefore undertook, and the rights and licenses it thereby
conveyed, could legitimately be enforced against and on behalf of those for whom it purported to
act. Similarly, the legitimation of the enforcement of customary international law was derived in
classical theory from the fact that such law represented the “practice of states” accepted by them
as based on law.
But, as described in Part II, above, post-Cold War Western international legal scholarship
has mounted a sustained attack on this state-based justification of international law.145 Whether
presented as an attack on the vacuousness of the idea of “state sovereignty,’146or the claim of
universal jurisdiction to enforce human rights,147 this scholarship has sought to present the
interests of the individual and the state as being in opposition rather than reinforcing. The state,
this scholarship has suggested, is a predator, against whose rapaciousness international law
should intervene. Rather than the state mediating between the interests of the individual and
those of international society, this new scholarship posits “international community” and
international law as mediating between the individual and the state. “International community”
is portrayed as being more representative of the better interests of the individual than is the
nation state, and international law, arrived at with or without the consent of the state, a truer
protector of those interests than is state-based consent. And the legitimating basis for this law,
we are told, is “natural justice.”148 These claims are worth closer examination.
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The intellectual denigration of the role of the state by Western legal scholars in the postCold War international order, of course, has not been without foundations in factual realities. If
the new order symbolized anything, it was the triumph of Western practices and institutions, and
their supporting ideologies, over the competing practices of communism and other statist and
authoritarian ideologies. International developments in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s did not
simply underline the collapse of political and economic institutions in hitherto communist
societies, but also similar failures in Latin and Central America, South Asia, and Africa. It can
hardly be disputed that, by the close of the ‘80s, the political and economic structures of the
West – governance through elected legislatures, politically circumscribed bureaucracies, and
more or less privately organized markets – had proved more resilient and adaptable to societal
demands and pressures than had state-driven economies and governance by centralized political
regimes. Moreover, the institutional failures of non-Western societies extended well beyond the
political and economic spheres to embrace a sociological trend in such societies to reject the
local in preference for things Western. Demonstrably, citizens of these non-Western societies
seemed to prefer Western culture, including dress styles, music, movies, and even food over
those customarily available to them. And, for them, travel to the West – for employment,
education, or pleasure – were prized as expressions of progress. “Globalization” as the idea of
an all-embracing world system of politics, economics and culture, framed by and within the
West’s working institutions and structures became the banner of the new order.
This triumph of the West was frequently – and sometimes facilely – translated as the
supremacy of Western liberalism’s core concept of the individual over the state. An unsurprising
prescription by Western conservatives and libertarians was to unleash the individual from the
harness of state control. The level of the unrestricted autonomy of the individual became
yardsticks for evaluating the goodness of socio-economic and even political arrangements. The
maximization of privately ordered relationships became ends in and of themselves.
Somewhat more surprisingly, this challenge to the position of the state as a legitimate
interlocutor between and among individuals and groups also was mounted vigorously by those
who ordinarily consider themselves as progressive liberals or as “communitarians.” To this latter
group, the political despotism of “Third World governments,” their tolerance and perpetuation of
the social patriarchy in the face of the accelerating emancipation of women from such strictures
in the less statist West, and the incapacity of state-controlled economies to provide anywhere
near the level of well-being and comfort available in the market-centered societies of the West
undercut the value of the state as an organizing institution. This undermining of the state was
completed by its inability to provide internal security or external defense; an inability repeatedly
demonstrated by the collapse of the USSR (and its satellites), and the proliferation of civil and
guerrilla warfare in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. What was the use of the state if its function
was to repress individual initiative while failing to provide security? The functions of the state
might as well be reassigned. Unlike conservatives and libertarians, however, liberals and
communitarians could not simply dethrone the state and leave the individual to fend for herself.
In place of the state, these progressives gravitated towards two amorphous and ill-defined
institutions.
The first of these was “civil society.” The meaning of the term is as vacuous as its
invocation is pervasive. It apparently applies to any collective body that is not sponsored by, or
which does not purport to act on behalf of the state or its sub-units. Thus, the term just as readily

encompasses a giant transnational profit-motivated corporation such as Exxon-Mobil, as it does
the local neighborhood school’s Parents and Teachers Association. But it is this elasticity that
renders the concept of “civil society” an entirely inadequate substitute for the idea and place of
the state in international legal theory. The emergence and nurturing of “civil society” may well
provide desirable (and even necessary) checks on a state’s exercise of power, but this attribute
cannot substitute for the affirmative exercise of authority that is inherent in the regulatory role of
the state.149 Nor can “civil society” meaningfully ever be expected to take on those affirmative
roles. Its clients and interests will always be too functionally diffuse for it to generate any sort of
coherent and plenary exercise of authority – or even guidance. And just as important, there will
be no yardsticks against which to measure its performance and thereby hold it accountable to a
diffuse community. Notwithstanding the polyphonous criticisms of the state, its finite physical
boundaries and centuries of living experience have endowed it with reasonably stable and
predictable obligations. Customers of the state – citizens and residents – can therefore define
their expectations and make the state account for any shortcomings in the discharge of its duties.
With regard to civil society, such accountability is, at best, rare.
Most progressives implicitly recognize these shortcomings of civil society. At core, civil
societies rarely operate as anything other than as interest groups devoted to maximizing the
welfare of their narrow memberships. This makes them sectarian, rather than communitarian
institutions. Hence, many progressives who find the state a rather poor protector of the interests
of its clients are nonetheless unwilling simply to assign such functions as the guarantee of
security and liberty to “civil society.” Such persons contend, rather, for the existence of an
“international community.”
But what is “international community?” Does the term symbolize anything more than a
rhetorical flourish? In one sense, the aggregation of states that interact with each other and
whose behaviors are guided and constrained by rules clearly constitute a “community,” and one
that is international. But in standard parlance today it is not usually this relationship among
states that the term is intended to signify. Phrases such as “the community of states” or
“international society” are more likely to be used in such contexts. The usage of the term
“international community,” today, is often employed either for the purpose of identifying – at the
individual level – with other transnational members of the purported community or to dissociate
a miscreant – usually a government or government official – from membership in the
“community.” In other words, at a subjective level, the term in its popular usage seems intended
to embrace the transnational solidarity of the good and just, and the exclusion of evildoers.
Westerners, automatically, are in. Others are admitted on a case by case basis. More neutrally
framed, it can be said that the idea invokes an ethos of interactions among private parties that is
underpinned by the regulatory intervention of a select group of governments; namely, those
which are deemed to be accountable to their citizenry through popular participation.
Membership is conferred and legitimated by the claim of the existence at a personal level of
relationships among individuals who have equal capacity to determine the destiny of the globe
regardless of their nationality or citizenship. Individuals are direct members of a global
community, not derivatively so. This may well be a worthy aspiration, but is it descriptively
accurate? And in what sense can one meaningfully speak of international law as the product of
149
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this community? Or, is it that this community is the product of international law?
(a) Defining a Community
It is common place to speak of the protean character of the concept of community.150 At
one level, any aggregation of persons may be referred to as a “community.” Thus, a family;
faculty, students, and staff associated with a university; members of a labor union; members of
the Anglican Church; and, of course, the citizens of a country, unproblematically may be said to
constitute communities. But even persons whose attachments are a good deal more reified, such
as, for example, the general body of international lawyers, or even an entire group of legal
scholars, judges, and legislators engaged in a joint enterprise such as the making, construction
and enforcement of legislation, may be called a community.151
What is clear about the idea of a community is that it expresses a shared sense of
belonging; that sense may arise in one of two ways or, perhaps more accurately, the combination
of both. First, the sense may reflect the existence of affective ties. For example, members of a
family share a sense of kinship that binds them together while separating them from others. The
sense is not necessarily derived from any shared characteristics, whether physical, psychological,
or, increasingly, even genetic. It embodies passion rather than logic, trust and belief over
knowledge. At best, the shared sense of community in this setting is explained away in terms of
vestigial mysticisms and primordial connections. It may have served some functional purpose in
the past, but that is hardly a sufficient explanation for continuation – and indeed vibrancy – in the
modern world. What is true of the family also probably explains such consanguineously based
communal affiliations as tribal, ethnic, and in some cases, national communities.
The second type of a community is one that is built around functional needs. A
university constitutes such a community. Similarly, corporate bodies, armies, and labor unions
presumptively constitute communities. But it is not the case that any group that exists to
discharge a function thereby becomes a community. Like an affective community, the members
of a functional group must view themselves as having a special relationship towards each other,
and which they do not share with outsiders. Again, that sense of solidarity and difference, even
though generated and underwritten by the imperatives of reciprocal functional relationships, may
be solidified by the demands of past necessities. For example, many religious communities may
have come together for functional reasons, but the need to protect each other from external
hostilities may have resulted in generating the sort of unquestioning bond of shared loyalty and
exclusivity characteristic of affective affiliations. What is clear is that the strength of the bonds
created in functional communities vary widely. Among other factors, one may expect that those
bonds are shaped by the nature of the functions performed by the community, the intensity of the
interactions among its members necessary to carry out those functions, the spread or exclusivity
of the skills required of members, the barriers to acquisition of those skills, and the levels of
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external pressures to which members of the group believe themselves subject to.
It is evident, then, that this most significant attribute of a community – solidarity of membership
is shaped both by the internal dynamics of the group as well as by perceptions of threat from
outside. Indeed, the two factors do not necessarily operate independently of each other. In
particular, the internal dynamics of a community – especially, but by no means exclusively, of
one constituted by affective ties – is often influenced greatly by the members’ perceptions of
threats from the outsider.
An international community of state members readily fits within the idea of a community
defined in functional terms. As explained in Part I of this essay, although the functional
purposes that have sustained that community have varied over time, the membership of Christian
European societies has been a consistent feature of the community. The bonds of solidarity were
forged in part in the crusades against Islam. But it was the post-1492 commercial ventures and
the accompanying wars and necessities for dispute resolution principles that effectively
demonstrated the shared commonalities of European civilization and their differences from nonEuropean ones. The community, of course, expanded ultimately to include many of the latter,
but as demonstrated in Part II, the rapid expansion of the community which took place shortly
after World War II occurred at the cost of maintaining elements of the affective ties that are to be
found, however weakly, even in functionally derived communities. The fraying of those bonds
could be and were surmounted temporarily by the imperatives of winning allies in the intramural
conflict of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, this necessity was
dispensed with. The scrutiny of the bonds that held together the purported international
community of states now could be and, as demonstrated earlier, was pursued vigorously. Shared
values having been found wanting, the scrutinizers now faced the task of how to redefine the
international community and, even more crucially, how to implement that redefinition. And it is
in this context that international law has come to take on a central role.
As described in Parts I and II of this essay, the nature and politics of an international
community of states have shaped international law. Scholars like Grotius, Vattel and Wheaton
presented their views of international law within this context. But one of the seminal arguments
of international law scholarship in the post-Cold War environment has been to articulate a new
vision of international community; one that is virtually and exclusively created and shaped by
international law.
B. Our International Community
The new international community is an academic construct. In its idealized form, it is the
aggregation of humanity, interacting and relating to each other as individuals and groups with
minimal intrusion from the state. On its face, the idea has plausibility because it is the product of
a confluence of four significant events and trends. The first two are themselves direct products
of the end of the Cold War, the later two would not have exerted the influence on our academic
imagination that they have, but for the end of the Cold War.
In the first place, whatever else may be debated about the end of the Cold War (e.g. its
cause(s)), there is no doubting that one of its profound consequences was to leave the West as the
clear winner. NATO and the United States military had of course triumphed over the Warsaw

Pact and the Soviet Union; but even more profound than military success were the seemingly
inevitable conclusions to be drawn about the superiority of Western socio-economic and political
thoughts and institutions. There were a few cautionary voices,152 but the dominant perspective
was triumphalist, and conveyed in such highly acclaimed works as Francis Fukuyama’s “The
End of History.”153 The linchpin of contemporary Western intellectual thought and the
foundation of its institutions is, of course, the primacy of the individual. As one commentator
amply demonstrates after an extended survey of relevant literature, it is a tenet of liberal thought
that the community exists for the individual, not the individual for the community.154 The sacred
reverence in which concepts like “democracy” and “the market” are treated merely manifest this
core principle of Western legal thought. And, as demonstrated earlier in this piece, influential
international legal scholarship in the 1990s heavily deployed these animating concepts both to
explain and to recommend emerging trends in international law such as the idea of the
“democratic entitlement” and privatization.155 The state was to be decentered.
Secondly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and of Communism had, as an important
radiation, the termination of the use of the “Third World” as the theater for proxy fights between
the East and the West. Of course, the underlying local causes of conflict within the Third World
remained. Wars within and among these Third World groups and countries continued to be
fought as brutishly as they had been in the past. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the
field, however, made it possible for Western critics to be less reticent in their condemnations of
these wars and the human sufferings that they brought about. Confident that the Third World
belligerents would be no match for Western military might, many of these critics advocated
Western intervention "on humanitarian grounds” to terminate these conflicts. Faced with well
established principles of international law that explicitly forbade such intervention,156 these
proponents of neointerventionism advanced the doctrine of a single “international community,”
embracing the welfare of all as justification for such intervention. But for this argument to
succeed, the Third World states had to be shown as being unfit to be clothed in that most
quintessential of state attributes, sovereignty.
One approach was to show that Third World countries did not constitute “states” as
properly understood.157 This approach was helped along by the prevalence of Third World
countries, which, denied of the external financial and military assistance with which their support
had been bought by both the East and the West during the Cold War, rapidly disintegrated into
feuding local fiefdoms. These so-called “failed states” – overwhelmingly found in Africa –
seemed to bear out the claim that these were at best dysfunctional administrative units, but
certainly not states as classically understood.158 As failed states that were incapable of being
entrusted with the prerogatives of sovereignty, these territories were best administered as wards
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of the United Nations.159
An alternative approach was to question the meaning and scope of the idea of
sovereignty.160 This questioning generally proceeded on the basis of the entirely counterfactual
supposition that those who argued in favor of the proposition that sovereignty is a shield against
arbitrary external intervention thereby somehow viewed sovereignty as a plenary and
unchanging concept. Having set up this strawman, its easy demolition was then seen as thereby
delegitimizing any claim of freedom from external intervention.161 Arguments in favor of human
rights were reflexively asserted as authorizing “humanitarian intervention,” and even “regime
change” in support of “democratic governance.”
But perhaps the strongest arguments advanced in favor of an international community of
persons were provided by the emergence of human rights as a top-tier concern of international
law.162 The end of the Cold War certainly influenced the timing of and the manner in which
these concerns were articulated, but the substance of the concerns were hardly the product of the
Cold War or its termination.163 On the other hand, many of the suggestions advanced for dealing
with human rights violations in the post-Cold War era were products of the victorious ethos of
the West. In particular, international human rights evangelists of the West began to see
international human rights norms less and less in terms of their persuasive effect, and more and
more as coercive clubs to be used to bludgeon the rest into conformity.164 Demands for
information, self-reporting, committee reviews, consultations, and exhortations which had been
the hallmark of enforcement under the Cold War international human rights order165 were
increasingly replaced with the adversarial process of adjudication, frequently before a national
tribunal.166 This coercive imposition by Western jurists of their views of human rights on the
rest of international society could be made palatable only by the insistence of these jurists that
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they were acting not as neocolonialists engaged in a new mission civilisatrice, but as the
enforcers, on behalf of all of humanity, of universally recognized and accepted obligations.167
Fully recognizing that the legitimacy of laws can only be judged in terms of the values of a
community, these jurists attempted to support this exercise of power by insisting that all of
humanity formed a single community. Although national legislatures created these courts and
gave them their marching orders, the jurists would have us believe that they were nonetheless
acting on behalf of the international community, not their national systems.168
The fourth event that has contributed and lent the aura of plausibility to the idea of an
international community of peoples is the revolution in the technology of communications that
semiconductors, integrated circuits, and orbiting satellites have made possible. The ability to
transmit information at a given time from virtually any spot on the globe and to have that
information more or less instantaneously received by the intended audience has seemed to
transform the world into an unmysterious open book. The interactions of the television, video
cameras, satellite telephones, the internet and e-mail have, since the 1990s, given persons in the
West the capacity to observe in real time persons and events occurring quite some distance away,
and seemingly to bring home to the observer the immediacy for action in response to these
events. The result is that these “remote” events are rarely seen as historical alien tragedies to be
mulled, puzzled over, helplessly regretted then dismissed in drawing-room or parlor
conversations, but rather as the tragedies of the here and now about which Western political
leaders must “do something.” And the failure to act, far from suggesting incapacity, only
intensified the illusion that but for the failure, the tragedy could have been averted or at least
mitigated.169 These new technologies fostered the notion that observation is tantamount to
understanding, and that knowledge is the power to do something about the observed evil.
The 1990s provided numerous settings for the playing out of the consequences of the
mindsets generated by the four factors just discussed. It is by no means certain that the 1990s
were any bloodier or more brutish than any of the preceding decades of the 20th century. While
tragedies like those in Rwanda, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Chechnya – not to speak of the
somewhat less publicized but frequently no less gruesome events in a good part of the rest of
Africa (Algeria, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and
Sudan, to give the most conspicuous examples) – clearly stretched the bounds of mankind’s
inhumanities towards each other, equally tragic parallels can be found for each of these in the
preceding decades. To speak of Argentina, Biafra, Bangladesh, Beirut, Cambodia, Chile,
Cyprus, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Viet Nam, the Gulag, the Great Leap
Forward and the Holocaust, is to suggest some examples, and to which many others may be
added. One may fairly ask, therefore, whether we ought not be applauding and encouraging the
1990s mindset that sought to transform the problems of the other into that of a single
international community. And, indeed, if in fact the effects of the end of the Cold War, the
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West’s unquestioned dominance, its proselytization of human rights, and the uses of its
preeminent technological advantages were to create an international community. But, as I shall
show below, it is one thing for academic scholarship to hypothesize the existence of an
international community, and quite another for policy-makers and the population at large to live
it. And beyond such a disconnect, I shall argue, this disconnect between theory and reality is
itself harmful to the maintenance of a just legal order.
D.

Humanitarian Hegemony As International Order

One last abstraction about the idea of a community needs to be stated. It is that a
community defines itself. It does not exist merely because outsiders say so, but because the
members of the community see themselves as sharing bonds with each other. Nor is it a
sufficient basis for the existence of a community that one believes oneself to be a member of a
community. What counts is whether the “community” recognizes and accepts the belief. The
manner in which the community – after all an incorporeal entity – manifests that assent varies.
For example, no one doubts that the issuance of a passport (or a national identity card) by a
nation-state is dispositive of citizenship, and this is so regardless of the preference of some or
even most citizens of the state. By contrast, while a birth certificate is presumptive of
membership in a family, the actual belief of the other members of the family is, for most
purposes, dispositive. In the latter situation, the “community of the family” is virtually
indistinguishable from the aggregation of the members of the family. It is true that in some
instances, the family as a unit may be treated differently by the outsider (e.g. the state) than the
family as a community. In the case of the nation state, however, the “community” is essentially
indistinguishable from the unit. The unit, in this situation, takes on an existence that is separate
from its members. In either case, however, it remains entirely within the purview of the
members to decide. But the decision may be unconsciously arrived at.170 Whether a community
views someone as a member, or as an outsider, therefore must be assessed by examining the
various ways in which assent can be manifested. This entails the exploration of both the use of
expressive language and of conduct.
It has been the starting thesis of this essay that the core of the international order across
centuries has been shaped by the regulatory imperatives of intercourse among Western societies.
The resulting interactions have shaped a conforming belief system in the West, both among
countries and their general populace. In the process, these societies have in fact come to
constitute a recognizable international community.171 The problematic question that the essay
has sought to address explicitly in this Part is whether this community has in fact extended
beyond Western societies to embrace, not only non-Western nation states, but the peoples of
those states as well. The claim for this latter point has come to the fore only in the last decade or
so, and it has been grounded on the purported universality of the liberal ideals of democratic
governance and the inviolability of human rights. Yet, it is one of the paradoxes of this claim of
universality that Western societies have sought to convince nonbelievers of the legitimacy of
these ideals by focusing on the differences between Western and non-Western societies, and the
extent to which Western international preeminence is attributable to the superiority of these
ideals. As what follows will demonstrate, we find again and again a conflict in Western thought
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and practice between the assertion of the existence of an international community grounded on
affective ideals, and the use of these ideals as a utilitarian weapon to advance the supremacy of
the West over others.
Language has always played a significant role in distinguishing between those who
belong and those who do not. The terms “barbarian” “savage” and “uncivilized” have been used
normatively to depict, over time and cultures, the demarcation between insiders and others. The
hesitation with which these terms were deployed in the post-World War II generation that
preceded the neoconservative world order,172 when contrasted with their resuscitation in the
political discourse of the 1980s and 1990s,173 illustrates the point.
The environment in the former period was characterized by an inclusive ethos in which
the principle of self-determination was the driving force for the creation of an international
community of nation states. In our contemporary period, the tendency is to emphasize the
differences between the presumptively successfully -- because they’re inherently good -Western institutions and societies on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the systematic failures
that are the other. Thus, in the wake of the collapse of a bipolar world order, it has become
fashionable, then, to substitute any serious analysis or engagement with those other societies
with the facile act of name-calling. The governments of non-Western societies with whose
policies we disagree are thus dismissively referred to as “regimes.” Their leaders are routinely
referred to as “thugs.” The societies themselves are referred to as “rogue” or “pariah” states.
Rather than “collaborative interdependence,” the object has become hegemonic “globalization.”
The propriety of replacing the governments of non-Western societies is now debated less on
deontological grounds and more in terms of the ease and convenience with which it can be
accomplished.
And all of this is justified by reference to the twin concepts of the promotion of
democratic rule and the protection of human rights. And the zeal with which these ideas are
trumpeted and justified are hardly any less messianic than the “civilizing” ventures of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Of course, many academics and “human rights
activists” (but by no means the general population or even their governments) purportedly
distinguish between “regimes” and “dictators” on the one hand, and “the people” on the other,
but the line between the denunciation of a government and the demeaning of an entire society
can and has become quite thin. Recent events demonstrate the fragility of any such line-drawing
and, in any event, any such theoretical distinction is belied by actual governmental policies and,
of course, their reception by the general public.
Consider, as examples, the responses Western governments and societies have given to the
terror attacks on the United States allegedly organized under the auspices of Al Qaeda. These
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responses, admittedly driven by fear, and perhaps therefore somewhat exaggerated, nonetheless
expose – or at least bring to the surface – tendencies that are inherent in the forging of a
community which, among other things, entails the identification of and separation from the other.
Indeed, the similarities between the West’s response and those acts of non-Western societies that
ordinarily it condemns, reveal the poverty of the claimed linkages between idealized governance
mechanisms and the protection of human rights.
In the first place, the coalescing of empathy for the victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks
was genuinely communal. Le Monde accurately reflected the sentiments of virtually all
Westerners when it stated that “we are all Americans.”174 This sense of shared solidarity was
reinforced when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the quintessential institution of Western
international integration, invoked for the very first time Article 5 of its charter, declaring that the
terror attack on the United States constituted an attack on all of its members.175 Furthermore,
these declarations were backed up by affirmative governmental actions. The Financial
Accounting Task Force, an agency of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development, which, hitherto, had proved impotent in tracking-down the laundering by Western
banks of the proceeds of corruption from developing societies, became an effective fighting force
against the use of financial institutions in any way to facilitate the perpetration of any “terrorist”
acts against the West. Thus, transactions with only the slightest of incidental connections to
terrorism were outlawed without regard to their effects – however massive – on non-Western
societies. Overnight, lawful institutions on which non-Westerners had depended such as the “al
barakat bank”176 and the “Hawala” banking system177 were rendered internationally illegitimate.
The costs, however concrete and substantial, thereby imposed on displaced and governmentally
unrepresented population groups such as Somalis or Palestinians apparently are automatically
outweighed by any potential reduction – however minuscule and speculative – in terrorist activity
that may flow from these policies.178
Secondly, the antiterrorism crusade has accelerated and accentuated latent tendencies that
increasingly have seen the imposition of disabilities on non-Westerners within Western societies.
Indeed, one of the paradoxes of the last decade is that the vociferous criticism in the West of
human rights violations in the non-West was paralleled by increasing differentiation in the West
of the treatment among nationals and non-nationals.179 Apparently the relevant human rights
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yardstick is not whether a government is repressive of the rights of those subject to its powers, but
only whether a government oppresses “its own people.” In any event, whatever lingering
constraints Western societies felt in the imposition of burdens on non-nationals have been swept
away by the fact that the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States were
demonstrably foreign.180 They were nationals of the “other” in the sense that that word has had a
meaning to Western civilization since at least the eleventh Century.
The state, more explicitly than most communities, outwardly regulates access to membership
through the concept of citizenship. International law says virtually nothing about a “right” of
access to citizenship, and only slightly more about the right to opt out of it.181 International law,
however, has always been concerned with how strangers are treated within a national
community.182 Although in principle a foreigner is entitled to no rights other than those a host
state, as a matter of grace chooses to confer, increasingly, the principle of “national treatment,”
under which a foreigner receives treatment that is, in identified spheres, the equivalent of that
accorded nationals, has become reasonably well established in state practice. The genealogy of
this development is instructive.
Until the last decades of the nineteenth century, the sole check on the arbitrary treatment
of a foreign national was the intervention of the foreigner’s home government. This intervention
might be based on the existence of a bilateral treaty, or more likely under the accepted customary
international law norm that an attribute of nationality was the right of a state to intercede on
behalf of the national with foreign states. Whatever the ground, such intervention was entirely
discretionary, and therefore episodic. Moreover, the process was often capricious, ranging from
the use of unofficial channels to diplomatic representations or even the application of military
force. By the 1890s, however, and as Europe became unapologetic about colonial domination and
the doctrine of “manifest destiny” in the United States was transferred across the seas, these
Western governments insisted on explicit legal protections for their citizens sojourning in foreign
territories. The quintessential legal instrument was the “capitulations” system which, by treaty,
required nominally independent African and Asian societies to accord to European and U.S.
nationals residing in their territories privileged access to judicial tribunals.183 This system, which
resulted in the foreigner receiving treatment much more favorable than that available to the local
citizen, could not survive the merging norms of self-determination and the juristic equality of
states that followed the formation of the League of Nations.
The denunciation of the system by China and Turkey following World War I, the
conscious policies of the Franklin Roosevelt Administration to dissociate the United States in its
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foreign policies from the colonial temperament of Europe,184 and the triumph of “liberal
internationalism” following World War II, assured that the capitulations system was effectively
delegitimized before the first-half of the twentieth century had run its course. In its place the socalled “Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation” (or “Amity’) treaties undertook to guarantee on
reciprocal bilateral bases national treatment for the foreign national in specifically identified
areas.185 These treaties, driven primarily by the desire to protect the private economic interests of
nationals emphasized, naturally enough, fair and equitable access to the judicial processes of the
host country.186
Not surprisingly, then, in the post-World War II, post-colonial world, and under both
conventional and customary international law, the principle of “national treatment” has become a
well established doctrine.187 At the core of the doctrine is that a foreign national is entitled to
treatment that is no less favorable than that accorded nationals. And nowhere is the principle
more deserving of application than with regard to the extension of legal process to those charged
with legal violations by a government.188 Indeed, so apparently axiomatic is this
nondiscrimination principle that human rights laws ordinarily do not bother to distinguish among
sources of nationality in their statements of the obligations that governments owe to persons
subject to their jurisdiction.189
Yet a common phenomenon in the so-called “war” on terrorism has been to subject
foreigners to significantly disparate procedural disabilities from those to which nationals
similarly situated would be subjected. Thus, it has become customary practice in the United
States (although by no means exclusively so)190 to subject foreign nationals to secret, arbitrary,
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and indefinite detention.191 The right to the assistance of counsel has been greatly curtailed, and
indeed in the context of so-called “enemy combatants,” the government has argued with mixed
success the complete elimination of any right to counsel.192
But the deck has been stacked even higher against implying a state’s obligation to
provide equal and fair access to judicial process for the foreigner. The use of presidentially
decreed and wholly controlled “military tribunals” to process secretly proffered charges against
secretly identified persons rightly has generated a good deal of discussion and criticism.193 But
even where perversion of process is not so blatant, it takes a naïve suspension of disbelief to fail
to recognize that much of the Western justice system today proceeds in no insubstantial measure
by assigning guilt as much on the basis of mere national association as of actual conduct.194 And
most unhappily, it is no longer possible to deny the sanctioning and use of “extrajudicial
killings” as official government policy.195 And, indeed, the current President of the United States
apparently views such extrajudicial killings as “American justice.”196 And, as yet unresolved –
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because the subject is shrouded in impenetrable secrecy and double-talk by government officials
– is the accuracy of persistent reports that some countries, notably the United States, either
surreptitiously use torture or hand over their alien detainees to persons or governments likely to
use torture in obtaining information from the detainees.197
One can, of course, draw distinctions between these policies and the pervasive violations
of human rights for which “Third World dictators” have justly been criticized. It can, for
example, be argued that these are “temporary derogations” essential to the survival of the
community.198 Further, it might be pointed out that many of these measures have been subjected
to criticism by human rights activists in the West.199 But these observations do not go to the
point that I seek to make here: namely, that even in this age of advanced international
community building, discrimination against the other, even with regard to the most basic of
values – fair process – remains an important tool of social cohesion. And there is little evidence
that the use of this tool is checked by democratic processes. Indeed, when we combine those
processes with the impulse and drive for personal success that is integral to Western liberalism, it
may be that the incentive is in fact to “externalize” the costs of community building. The
capacity to do so effectively -- while maintaining a front of impartiality or shared costs -- is
itself, of course, one measure of the power of the West. And it is a power that after 1990 has
been used with increasing frequency. Whether “international law” can in fact act effectively to
regulate the apportionment for costs within international society is, therefore, the last set of
issues that I shall take up in this essay.
V. PAST IMPERFECTS, PRESENT CONDITIONALS, AND FUTURE SUBJUNCTIVES
A persistent theme of this essay has been that international law, like all law, regulates
behavior within the community. It is therefore possible to understand the boundaries of a
community by inquiring into the scope of the conduct under regulation. Grotian international
law, for example, operated within a community of seafaring European states.200 Even when
that law purported to regulate interactions with non-Europeans, it did so in the context of
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competition among Europeans vis-à-vis each other. How the Dutch should behave toward the
princes of Batavia was relevant not for its own sake, but only because it provided a measure for
regulating how the Portuguese should do so. Just how Javans should relate to Goans was outside
the scope of these rules.201 In time, of course, the relevant international community came to
embrace not only the European world, but the nation states of the non-Western world as well.202
The distinctive contribution of the 1990s, this essay has tried to demonstrate, is that there exists
an international community which transcends nation states as actors to embrace the peoples of
those states. This contention, the essay has shown, is undercut by the actual practice of states.
And yet it is the case that state practice notwithstanding, modern technologies have made it more
likely for the average individual to be a participant in the affairs of international society than was
ever the case previously. But the existence of capacity is not tantamount to its utilization.
Moreover, the nature of the uses to which the technologies are put surely are relevant
considerations as well. For example, do the participants employ the technologies primarily to
communicate solidarity, or to further differentiate themselves from others? And there remains
the extent to which international law suffuses the role played by individuals in the shaping of
international society.
A. Of Circuits, Networks, and Communities
The relevance of technology to community formation may be considered at three levels.
First, central to the role of technology in shaping a community is its capacity to facilitate
communication among persons. Such communication technologies can act both to create and to
cement social norms and values. The effectiveness of a technology in thus expanding the
horizons of interpersonal communications clearly has a direct bearing on the expanse of a
community. It is perhaps therefore not surprising that the emergence of a European-wide culture
in the second-half of the fifteenth century parallels the emergence and widespread adoption of
the printing press. This technology both strengthened the shared European embrace of
Christianity, and fostered creative challenges to the existing orthodoxy in the form of the
protestant reformation movement. That European Christians rather than Moslem Arabs became
heirs to Greek thought – including “democracy” – probably owes less to any intrinsic affinities
between Roman Catholicism and Stoicism, on the one hand, and Islam and hedonism or
skepticism on the other, than it does to the greater capacity of Christian Europe to disseminate
the works of Aquinas and Wycliffe, made possible by the availability of the printing press.
The technologies of transportation have also played significant roles in the configuring of
communities. A mobile culture is a good deal more effective in communicating its views to
strangers and learning from those cultures. The traveler of course imparts knowledge, but
perhaps even more consequentially, the traveler imbibes the knowledge of her hosts, and then
acts as a transmission belt for that knowledge. As suggested early in this essay, that European
ideas came to shape international law is attributable in part to Europe’s mastery of the nautical
technologies that permitted Christian Europe to establish its unchallenged presence in the
Americas and to bypass much of the Moslem World -- and especially the Ottoman empire -- in
establishing direct contacts with Africa and Asia.203 The role of European travelers in spreading
knowledge to and from distant lands is well documented. But no less consequentially, Europe’s
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superior maritime technology also permitted it to control not only the terms of exchange of
knowledge, but just as importantly, the flow of material resources between and among these
cultures. As many historians and social scientists have amply demonstrated, this control, more
than virtually any other factor, explains the ascendancy of European civilization over others in
modern times.204
Finally, the third set of technologies that have been crucial in forging (and, therefore, also
in separating) communities is that of weaponry. Warfare has been essential in shaping
communities. Technological developments in the weapons used in warfare have determined the
organization of the war waging forces, their mobility, strategies, tactics, and occupation policies.
The internecine wars among European societies during the middle ages clearly gave these
societies a strong incentive to develop the technologies of weaponry and, by the beginning of the
nineteenth century, Europe was clearly without rival in its mastery of the technologies of
warfare. European communities were able to project power across the seas, and to maintain
effective fighting and occupation forces quite some distance from their home territories.
These three sets of technologies were reinforcing. A communication technology such as
the telegraph also served crucial roles in the military sphere. Similarly, steam and jet engine
technologies have been equally important in military as in the general transportation arenas.
And, of course, there is no bright line between communication and transportation for not only
can these function as substitutes, but they have a synergistic relationship. Easier transportation
facilitates communication, and communication creates demand for transportation.
These observations are relevant for understanding the nature of the “international
community” that purportedly emerged in the 1990s. Developments in technology seemed to give
a sense of realism to yearnings that, in the prior three decades, had essentially been dismissed as
utopian.205
The seminal technological development of our generation has been the mass deployment
of the integrated circuit or semiconductor chip.206 Central to the arguments of claimed formation
of an international community have been the effects of this ubiquitous deployment in such
seemingly disparate arenas as geosynchronous orbiting satellites, guidance systems – military
and civilian – mobile telephones, computer systems, and computer networks. The integrated
circuit technology is unquestionably one of a handful of genuinely revolutionary discoveries, but
even more crucially is the “paradigm-shift” that its mass deployment has generated.
The most obvious ways in which the new technologies of the semiconductor chip have
seemingly contributed to the creation and shaping of an international community are in their
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communication effects. First, and perhaps foremost, these technologies permit near
instantaneous communication across the globe. Taken singly and collectively, the internet, the
mobile telephone, and satellite broadcasting have shrunk both space and time among the peoples
of the world. Secondly, the relative affordability of these technologies to the so-called “ordinary
person” – both in the West and a good part of the rest of the globe – makes each such ordinary
person a potential participant in the interactive society that these technologies permit. They
therefore effectively serve as substitutes for the role that transportation played in prior times, and
do so for a much greater portion of the population than the latter ever did. Travel seemingly is
no longer necessary in order to observe the locals in their natural habitats, nor does the common
person need to rely exclusively on the mediated retelling of stories by adventurers to gain insight
into foreign behavior. The ordinary person is thereby equipped with relevant information which
he and she can effectively interpret and act on. Because she is able to make judgments for
herself based on first-hand information, she can create a genuine relationship with foreign
societies that, among other things, legitimate her interference in the affairs of those societies.
But these beliefs would remain essentially that, beliefs, except for the impact of the new
technologies on the third aspect of community-building, namely, the use of force.
Semiconductor technology has changed radically the projection of force. Embedded in guidance
systems, it has made possible the capacity to hit one’s opponent from quite some distance and
without having to put oneself directly at risk. The use by the United States of tomahawk cruise
missiles against societies such as the Sudan and Afghanistan typifies this new mode of projecting
force. The approach is also found in the tactics of warfare adopted by NATO in Kosovo. Rather
than face-to-face combat, the tactic requires the launching of missiles some distance from their
targets. The “hit” is captured in video, and is observed in real time but from a safe distance by
the launcher.
This postmodern projection of force therefore entails several asymmetries, all of which
are effectively disguised by the illusion of direct participation both on the part of the launcher
combatant and by the civilian observers for whom the reality of this sort of war is indeed
“virtual.”207 Before exploring these asymmetries and the challenges that they pose to the
argument of the existence of an international community, I shall first return to an evaluation of
the validity of the assumption that a shared international communication network is evidence of
the existence of an international community.
B. An International Community without the Rule of Charity?
One may question the extent to which the new technologies of communication have, in
fact, penetrated particular societies. Unquestionably there are disparities -- a so-called “digital
divide” -- among and within societies in access to the internet, the cell-phone, and satellite/cable
television.208 But there is now sufficient dispersal of these technologies, and history suggests
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there will be greater penetration with the passage of time, that we may fairly assume that the
socio-political forces that they have unleashed are at least minimally representative. I shall
therefore assume that it is reasonable to take on faith the validity of the descriptive
manifestations of a shared ethos of belonging to a more or less “global village.”209 But this is a
misplaced sense of belonging. It is misplaced in part because the interpretive capacities of
human beings have not caught up with the capacities of these new technologies to deliver
evidentiary information, and in part because the asymmetries of the distributions of power that
have been deepened by these new technologies undercut any incentive to strive for such a
catching-up.
One of the defining features of postmodern sensibilities is the ease with which perception
and reality are equated. Indeed, the argument that “appearance” is itself a “reality” is
commonplace in the West, and generally, it is rarely questioned. And, while rarely so boldly
stated, it is the latter “reality” – if it differs at all from the former – that constructs human
behavior. This understanding of perception as constitutive of reality is amply manifested in the
ways that international legal scholars have come to identify the “reality” that is worthy of scrutiny
and regulation.
Television cameras, and what they are able to display vividly, have become central to the
shaping of the new international legal order. This is perhaps understandable. The visual
displays of the brutalities of warfare, for example, concentrate the mind on the need for action to
stamp out such evils. That those brutalities are being perpetrated by persons who are clearly
unlike us make their deeds even more monstrous, and far from generating a desire to examine
and understand the causes of their conduct, we are more likely to feel the desire to get rid of their
scourge by chastising them. And since we are all witnesses to the evil acts in display, we are all
entitled to feel “violated,” and not only to sit in and pronounce judgment, but to determine the
appropriate punishment as well. Thus, the thrust of the new international legal order, as I have
explained, has been to focus on coercive measures of enforcement.210 For this purpose,
intellectual rationalizations typically provide inadequate support. The appeal must be visceral.
The more graphic and vivid the alleged wrong can be depicted, the more support the proposed
coercive corrective measure is likely to garner. Atrocities to which particularized human faces
can be attached, therefore, tend to be more the concern of contemporary international law than
those atrocities that are less susceptible of direct attribution. Ineluctably, it would appear,
contemporary international law deploys its coercive powers to punish Balkan “ethnic cleansers,”
Rwandan “genocidaires” and other African “war lords,” but remains entirely silent on the
culpability of policy-makers for socio-political and economic policies such as those that result in
un-seaworthy ships filled with refugees being towed into the open sea where they break up with
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stricken societies, let alone the subsidization of agricultural production with its attendant
anticompetitive effects on food production in the needy parts of world.
In a genuine community, these would be perfectly understandable sentiments. But have
the cameras and the new communication technologies forged an international community? The
very strengths of the new technologies may actually undercut their capacity to do so. One must
question the prescriptive entitlement of the illusion that perceiving suffering is tantamount to
sharing in it. That distinction is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the speed with which those of
us on the perceiving end switch to new issues. It is a speed that, again, the new technologies
facilitate. The haste with which we engage and drop conspicuous sufferings in other places,
when added to our indifference to sufferings and causes that are not susceptible of visual
displays, suggest that experience through perception makes us less participants than observers.
That we may possess superior physical resources and technical expertise can only be a partial
basis for imposing our preferences and prescriptions on communities based on our understanding
of events which tends to be at best shallow and, at worst, nonexistent.
If the strengths of the new communications age are the immediacy and breadth of
information flows across communities, equally obvious characteristics are such shortcomings as
the fleeting nature of the information acquired and the low rate of absorption. Indeed, it may be
said that one way of distinguishing among communities is the level of intensity with which
recipients of information engage it. The superficiality of absorption, coupled with the certainty
of knowledge, creates what might be termed a credibility gap. That gap has been manifested in a
variety of situations. While information about our own societies are routinely revised, updated,
and reevaluated, our knowledge -- and more troublingly our views -- of those societies that I
have termed “other” remain uncomplicatedly static. Compare, for example, two instances
relating to the acquisition and use of data, and their relevance to judicial proceedings.
By July, 1994, it was evident that widespread massacres among the general population
had occurred during the prior three months in Rwanda. The death toll of 500,000-800,000 began
to be bandied about.211 Ten years later, more or less the same figures are used.212 This is so
even though the factual accuracy of these figures is highly dubious. They were figures
concocted in the midst of a ranging and emotionally charged civil war. Unquestionably, they
were deployed at the outset as the best guess/estimates under the warring circumstances, and
because they served as effective propaganda. But neither of these reasons explains why they
have continued to command uncontested invocation in the press.
This situation should be contrasted with the treatment of data relating to how many
people were killed at the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001. In the fog of the initial tragedy
-- as in war-torn Rwanda -- the estimate was that perhaps 6,000 persons had been killed.213 As
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information became available with the passage of time, this figure was revised, and continually
downwards, so that within two years after the event it had been conclusively and authoritatively
determined that just about 2,750 persons were killed.214 Thus initial estimates proved to be at
least double the actual deaths.215
The differences between the Rwanda and World Trade Center approaches to the
gathering, evaluation, review and, above all, updating of data are neither aberrational nor
accidental. In the former situation, initial data, even though known by all to be incomplete and,
therefore, unreliable remained unedited. The data had a single purpose: it viscerally to depict
the inhumanity of “the other.” As long as it served this purpose, the accuracy of the data –
500,000, 800,000, or 1.5 Million – makes little difference. By contrast, the WTC data served
different purposes at different times. Initially the data, as in Rwanda, were used to depict and to
obtain condemnation of the inhumanity of the perpetrators of the dastardly acts, as well as to
mobilize the population for a counteroffensive. With the passage of time, administrative and
bureaucratic demands came to dominate. Accurate data had to be obtained for such purposes as
confirmation of fatality to bereaved relatives and friends, payment of insurance, and, of course,
adjudication of entitlement to relief. Rwandans may have their own administrative and
bureaucratic needs, and for those, precision of data may or may not be as consequential as in the
United States,216 but it is in the nature of the new communications technologies that the
information that is unearthed and disseminated is driven by the demands of those in the West.
This gap between the illusion of knowledge because of the ease of access to information
and the reality of the credibility of the information has been demonstrated vividly in the
controversies surrounding the issue of the existence of “weapons of mass destruction” in Iraq.
That the information disseminated prior to the invasion of Iraq was, in several respects
unreliable, seems to have come as a shock to many. But that shock is surely hollow.217 The
unquestioning acceptance with which the so-called evidence was received prior to March 20, and
the skepticism to which such evidence was subjected after May 1, reflects no more than the
changed needs that the information were intended to serve. Prior to March 20, Iraq belonged
squarely to the camp of “the other.” It was “a rogue state.” Its government was “a regime.” Its
people for the most part simply were abstractions; an incidental or “collateral” element of the
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A common saying is that a society can be judged by how it treats its dead. It is equally true that membership in a
community can be determined by how readily the community acknowledges a death as constituting a loss to it. The
running data of how many lives have been lost is thus as good an indicator of membership within a community as
any other piece of evidence. Typically, we can almost be told with precision how many Westerners -- soldiers,
journalists, and aid volunteers -- have been killed in a strife-torn environment (e.g. Iraq), but the death of locals at
best is reported sporadically, and no definitive number is ever furnished.
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conflict between the “international community” (actually the United States) and their country.
The denials of the regime as to the country’s possession of “WMDs” merited no credence. By
contrast, the assertions of the United States based on “intelligence” constituted gospel truth. Not
even the experts doubted that “WMDs” existed. The question that divided the West was simply
whether the relevant evidence was more likely to emerge through prolonged peaceful inspection
or a short “shock and awe” war. After May 1, Iraq began to take on a corporeal reality. This
was driven not, however, by the actual needs of the society, but because United States and
British personnel began to take on unanticipated casualties. Neither American nor British
citizens are abstractions; nor are their fiscal expenditures. And, as long as Iraqi society – in
contrast, for example, to Afghani society – imposes such costs on the West, then the available
information is real and will be updated. If and when the costs are no longer felt by the West, we
will undoubtedly revert to the situation where information is presented primarily to titillate, and
static information with the mythology that it represents will remain standard fare.
The superficiality of the transcendence of the new technologies across boundaries of
community is also present when we consider their application to the sphere of transportation. In
former times, the technologies of transportation mediated the experiences of two different
societies through the traveler. The traveler acted both as a transmitter of her home culture, and
as a translator of foreign culture. A good traveler spent enough time within the foreign
community to imbibe the culture and appreciate its distinctions and similarities to her home
culture. Moreover, because her interlocutors on her return were only too aware of the secondary
source of the translations that they received, they were more likely to interrogate and critique the
received knowledge that the traveler imparted to them. At any rate, they treaded with care and
lack of surefootedness in prescribing and imposing rules based on the translations they received
from the traveler. By contrast, the near-instantaneity of engagement permitted by the new
technologies of communication and transportation has turned every observer into an armchair
traveler, competent to discern and interpret foreign culture. At times, we may even question
whether there is such a thing as “foreign culture,” for our supposedly unmediated perceptions
give us the authority to pronounce on the rectitude of the actions of others, and in doing so, we
apply “universal” principles. Surely, we all know that it is wrong to kill. Our own direct
observations prove that this is known to all cultures. Therefore, it must follow that the idea of
“self-defense” as a justification for killing can only be evaluated universally, and my perception
of what constitutes self-defense must therefore be universal. But, surely, to make this contention
is to display its shallowness. At one level, we are human because we share the gift of intelligible
speech. Yet, no one would seriously contend that this means that languages are the same, or
(what is the same thing) that any claim that languages are different must be fallacious. Yet, this
is precisely a position that came to dominate international legal discourse in the 1990s, aided and
abetted in no small part by the illusion that the capacity to obtain near instantaneous information
about a society is tantamount to knowledge of the society.
This arrogance of the intellect is reinforced by the reality of the possession of physical
power. Descriptively, we are regularly reminded that there is now one sole superpower, a
colossus that bestrides a genuinely narrow world, and that is capable of projecting its power to
all corners of the globe. This supremacy of the military might of the United States flows directly
from its dominance in the new technologies of warfare. The United States is also said to be an

“indispensable power.”218 It is unclear, however, whether this is a descriptive or a normative
claim. For example, is it indispensable because its power is uncontested, or because its
involvement is seen to be essential in the resolution of all international conflicts? At any rate, its
behavior makes plain that it should not be seen simply as a primus inter pares, but as the sole
arbiter and linchpin of the entire international system. While in the 1990s this disparity of power
could effectively be presented in hegemonic terms – an approach that was endorsed
wholeheartedly by the rest of the West – more recently the persistence (and indeed expansion) of
the disparity of power between the United States and the rest has meant that only by assuming
the title as well as the functions of an imperium can the claim and the reality be fairly squared.
Might has always played a central role in the formation and maintenance of communities.
Military force has been the primary source of that might. It was used extensively by West
Europeans as they first destroyed and then reconstituted colonial societies. Indeed, it was also
central to the formation of nation states in Europe. National communities, necessarily, are led
and governed. That these communities invariably are organized hierarchically surely is not
accidental. And yet proponents of the new international community of peoples would have us
believe that we are in an era of association of peoples who form voluntary horizontal
communities. Since many of these proponents themselves come from the powerful countries of
the world, they must implicitly either view their national power as irrelevant to the formation of
an international community, or the exercise of such power as benign. Such views either are
conceits or duplicitous. Let us, therefore, explore the relationship of power and law, and what
role that relationship plays in the construction of an international community.
C. Law, Power, and Integration
A conventional humane account of the makings of our contemporary international legal
order goes something like the following:
Even as war ranged around them, far-sighted men in Europe, the Americas and Oceania
were determined to create institutions that would assure that there would never be such another
war. The primary institution for realizing this hope was the United Nations. In outlawing the
use of force, and by adopting the Declaration on Human Rights, the members of the United
Nations launched the modern version of the age-old quest to turn swords into ploughshares, and
to establish a republic of justice.
These hopes proved to be stillborn. Regulation of the use of force depended on
cooperation among the members of the Security Council. But the Cold War made such
cooperation impossible. The Security Council stood by while the “great powers,” in complete
disregard of Article 2(4), crushed popular uprisings and overthrew duly constituted governments
in such satellites as Hungary, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan,
and Granada, among other places. Likewise, the Security Council proved itself equally impotent
in dealing with cross-border wars involving mid-level powers such as those over the Suez Canal,
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Bangladesh, and Cyprus. Meanwhile, internal civil strife in the Third World went un-policed on
the ground that outside interference was barred under Article 2(4). Thus the international
community stood by powerlessly as massacres occurred in Algeria, Indonesia, Nigeria, and other
societies. And where the Security Council got involved, as in the Congo, Rhodesia, and the
Arab-Israeli conflict, its record was more likely to be counterproductive than useful.
Similarly, the protection of human rights under the Charter depended on a uniformly
strong voice from all members of the international community. Yet, counter intuitively, the Cold
War also made it impossible to have such a chorus from across the globe. While primary
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security was assigned to the Security
Council, the promotion of international human rights was seen as the general responsibility of
each and all member states. The Economic and Social Council which had direct supervisory
responsibility was not subject to the counter-majoritarian disability of the exercise of a veto
power. And the General Assembly which ostensibly represented the conscience of mankind had
plenary authority over human rights issues. But these two bodies proved equally ineffectual in
protecting human rights. The reason, unfortunately, was as simple as it was unpardonable.
Because the international system was a system of governments, democratic societies overlooked
human rights violations by non-democratic governments in order to obtain the votes of the latter
in the bipolar conflict that was the Cold War. Thus, the twin aims of the United Nations
remained entirely aspirational until the end of the Cold War. But the lessons to be learned were
obvious.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, international society was offered a second chance to
redeem itself. Central to this renewal must be the promotion of democracy, human rights, and
the rule of law. Democracy requires that governments be constituted on the basis of the results
of “free and fair” elections that are subject to scrutiny by the international community. Human
rights demand that governments treat their citizens with respect, and subject to internationally
proclaimed rules. And the rule of law requires that governments operate within specified bounds
and in a manner universally recognized not to be arbitrary.
What is crucial about the renewal, however, is that it must avoid the fundamental flaw of
the Cold War United Nations regime: the lack of enforcement mechanisms. It is not sufficient
to proclaim ideas, but the ideas must be enforced. “International community,” therefore, ought
not to shrink from the use of force or other sanctions when necessary to implement compliance
with the undertakings of the members of the community. Ordinarily, such enforcement should
be collectively undertaken, but the lack of a collective will should not bar individual members
from acting on behalf of the community when the collective will cannot be mustered. What is
paramount is that rogue governments must be constrained, and in this undertaking, governments
and nongovernmental organizations must cooperate to identify, isolate and, where appropriate
punish such governments.
It is my hope that a reader of this essay can, by now, recognize the poverty of the
seemingly lofty objectives in the preceding paragraph. Before summarizing the claims of this
essay by outlining the flaws of this vision for our contemporary legal order, let us contemplate a
different account from the conventional one just presented. An alternate account would run as
follows:

Having witnessed the despoliation of Europe for the second time through widespread war
within a single generation, the patrician leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom
sought to reconstitute an order that they hoped would spare their generation from a third. This,
they believed, could be done in part through the reconstitution of and tinkering with the legal and
political institutions that had been created following World War I, provided that United States
membership was assured. In keeping with familiar constitutional ideas in both societies, this
required an institution that gave both expression to the general population, while assuring that
effective power could be exercised only with the affirmative consent of the most materially
endowed (and therefore privileged) minority group. Hence, the bifurcation of the decisionmaking processes between the General Assembly and the Security council and, just as
importantly -- and in contrast to the League of Nations -- the lodging of Chapter VII powers and
veto rights within the latter body.219
These leaders, however, recognized that the real price of war lay in the economic
institutions that would safeguard the peace. For this purpose, the United Nations was given at
most symbolic responsibility.220 The primary institutions, the International Monetary Fund and
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, although ostensibly allied to the
United Nations, functioned as completely independent entities. Crucially, voting patterns in
these institutions paralleled those in the Security Council. No decision of any consequence could
be taken without the affirmative concurrence of privileged members, especially the United
States. This was achieved through the process of “weighted voting.”221
Thus, at the creation, social justice – including human rights – was not envisaged as a
primary concern of the post World War II order. That instruments such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the various human rights conventions were adopted is more a
testimony to the capacity of subalterns – notably countries in Latin America and Asia – to
insinuate themselves into the order-generating process, than it is the product of the far-sighted
benevolence of the West. Far from constituting a betrayal of the hopes and aspirations of the
founders of the post-World War II international order, Cold War events played out within an
order that was foreshadowed and mapped out in the immediate aftermath of World War II. This
international order was a bifurcated one in which while lip service was given to the “sovereign
equality of states,” it was also recognized that the practical functioning of international
institutions was to be based on a classification of states that distinguished between those with
power and privilege and those without. “Human rights” was simply not part of the picture.
There was one significant event that the founders of the United Nations did not
anticipate: the rapid decolonization movements of the 1950s and 1960s. This was important not
so much because it changed the balance of power – exercised through voting rights – in the
General Assembly of the United Nations, nor necessarily because it delegitimized the claims of
France or the United Kingdom to be “great powers” entitled to the veto power in the Security
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Council (after all, Taiwan “legally” possessed this power for 22 years), but because it presented
fundamental challenges to the economic structures of the post-World War II order.222 The
emergence of the colonized societies of Africa and Asia as independent sovereign states could be
addressed readily within the existing legal and political institutional structures of the Cold War
order. To be sure, that voting blocs formed by these newly independent states were not
infrequently in opposition to the West presented, at most, a political nuisance. This was so even
when that voting bloc coalesced with that of the Communist world. The political institutions of
the United Nations were simply not constructed to bypass the strong opposition of the powerful
members.
Decolonization, however, presented more serious challenges to the preconceived
institutionalization of the post World War II economic order; and these challenges – and the
responses that they generated – were to have significant reverberations in international politics
and law. The quintessential consequence of decolonization was to shift the locus of decisionmaking from the metropolitan country to the new state. While the significance of the change
was often exaggerated through rhetoric, one area in which the profundity of the change could not
be masked was in the accounting for the economic transactions of the state. No longer could
deficits and surpluses between metropolitan and colonial societies be treated simply as
bookkeeping entries that could be rounded off by the economic health of the metropolitan state.
Local decision-makers had to take responsibility for the economic consequences of these
imbalances. The need to do so made explicit the structural shortcomings of the economic order.
One of the most obvious of those shortcomings was the extent of the inequality in the terms of
commercial intercourse between the colonies and the metropolitan countries. Colonies
essentially provided raw materials at prices dictated by demand among metropolitan
manufacturers. But it was these same manufacturers who determined, seemingly unilaterally, the
price at which finished goods would be sold. Economic independence thus did not follow
political independence.
Unsurprisingly, the leaders of the newly independent countries sought to use their
political power to effect change in the terms of the commercial intercourse undertaken within
and by their countries. In a seemingly choreographed dance -- the steps to which are discernible
in virtually all so-called “developing countries” -- these societies began by offering incentives to
foreign manufacturers to spur investments within their economies. They offered “tax holidays,”
created “industrial parks” and “processing zones,” and offered legal protection by entering into
or accepting bilateral and multilateral guarantees such as Amity treaties,223 and the New York
Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.224 Next, greatly influenced by the
theory of “import substitution” that had been distilled into the mainstream by the United Nations’
Economic commission for Latin America, many of these countries, in seeming disregard of their
international legal obligations under GATT, selectively imposed quantitative restrictions and
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gave preferences to locally manufactured products.225 In time, these countries would wield their
collective political power both in the United Nations General Assembly and in the GATT
Council to try to change the international law rules on economic transactions. But these efforts,
putting it charitably, met with mixed success. The attempt at institutionalizing a “new
international economic order” was a resounding failure, and the GATT’s endorsement of a
“Generalized System of Preferences,” while providing somewhat of a legal framework for the
differential treatment within the international system that was sought by developing countries,
fell far short of meeting those countries’ revolutionary demands for structural changes within the
system.226 Just as in the political arena, the post-World War II economic structures proved
sufficiently resilient to accommodate and frustrate the claims and pressures of the new states,
notwithstanding their numbers or the “justice” of their claims. The institutions of the post-War
Order had taken clear-headed account of the significance of power in international relations, and
although the system was occasionally bent to permit the escape of intolerable pressures on it, for
the most part the system at its core easily absorbed those pressures.
A third development posed a much more significant challenge to the international order,
and the responses that it elicited and their reverberations in important ways have continued into
the post-Cold War order. By the late 1960s, two forces from distinct sources had combined to
generate this challenge. In the first place, with neither the incentives-driven policies for
attracting investments, nor the rule-flouting import-substitution policies able to arrest the
economic underperformance of “developing countries,” many of them turned explicitly
nationalistic. Invoking “national sovereignty” they dictated the terms on which foreign
investment in their countries were to be undertaken. Foreign ownership and control were
drastically restricted, and in some cases banned outright.
But it is unlikely that the initial success developing countries met in their use of political
power to control foreign multinationals, many of them global behemoths whose economic
resources dwarfed those of the regulating Third World state, would have been possible but for a
second parallel development. Beyond the anticipation of any one at San Francisco or Bretton
Woods, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, defeated powers, were, by the middle part
of the 1960s, economic superpowers. Their industrial and financial might now exceeded those of
all but the two military superpowers. Taken together with the equally frenetic pace of industrial
growth that was occurring in most of Europe and North America, the effect was to put sustained
demands on raw material production. Developing countries, as producers of increasingly scarce
commodities, naturally enough sought to maximize their returns, and as has been explained,
invoked their claim of sovereignty to justify the coercive regulations they adopted to divert as
much of the returns as they could to themselves and their nationals. Of course, the industrialized
countries could have forestalled such diversion through concerted action. Initially, however, this
did not happen for two reasons. First, as a trenchant economic observer of the period has pointed
out, by the late 1960s, United States companies which had been sheltered from the competitive
effects of the reindustrialization of the export-based economies of Germany and Japan by their
control of the sizeable U.S. internal market could no longer rely on this ace.227 The effect of the
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Kennedy rounds of the GATT negotiations had been to drastically reduce the tariff barriers to
which industrial products were subjected, and German and Japanese manufacturers had honed
their manufacturing and marketing skills in a brutal world of competition to sell goods even in
the relatively closed economies of much of the world. They had accumulated a good deal of
profit in the process, and they were ready to do battle with U.S. and British companies in the
latter’s home markets. Thus, the period 1965-1973 was a genuinely competitive period in
international commerce among the industrial corporations of the West. Focusing predominantly
on this competition, neither these corporations nor their home governments foresaw the raw
materials threat from the Third World. Indeed, much of the literature of this period revolved
around the threat posed by multinationals and their home countries, not by the clearly
impoverished Third World.228 To the contrary, the economic history of this period (1965-1973)
is replete with stories of “competitive devaluations of currencies,” the imposition of “interest
equalization taxes,” and other monetary and fiscal policies by industrialized country
governments that were intended to assist their home multinationals in the competition with other
industrialized economies and their multinationals.229 Moreover, German and Japanese
companies, closely tied as they were to conservative industrial banks and a risk-averse
government, respectively, preferred accommodation over confrontation in their dealings with the
Third World. The governments of the latter soon enough recognized that the path to victory
often lay in isolating a weak link among the multinationals, reaching agreement with it, and
threatening remaining hold-outs with complete disinvestment.230 For this purpose, it was not
necessary that the “weak link” be a Japanese or a German company, as long as it feared that
companies stood in the wing ready to take over its concessions or contractual rights.
The “victory” of the Third World, however, was short lived. By 1975, events such as the
Yom Kippur war, the use by Arab states of oil embargoes in support of that war, the dramatic
increases in the price of oil and of other commodities and, above all, the surprisingly cohesive
and concerted effort in 1974 by “the group of 77” to employ the United Nations General
Assembly to fundamentally alter the laws of international economic relations. By 1975, the
nature of the threat was obvious, and the West presented a coordinated response. The response
was occasionally stumbling, but driven by “stagflation” at home, and by such continuing external
threats as the Iranian revolution of 1979, a new crude oil crisis, and a neoconservative reaction
exemplified by sweeping Conservative and Republican party victories in the U.K. and U.S.,
respectively, the West confronted directly the challenges of the Third World. Acting through
such institutions as the OECD, the IEA, the G7 and, occasionally, the IMF, Western
governments coordinated their fiscal and monetary policies through the 1980s.231And this
coordination continued into the 1990s and the current decade.232
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A consequence of the West’s response was a precipitation of the “debt crisis” of the
1980s. The flow of capital into the Third World dried up. This put pressures on the West’s
private banking system, but through coordinated action at the Bank for International Settlement - a cooperative institution of Central Bank Governors -- and at Treasuries and Ministries of
Finance, Western economies were to absorb those costs with relative equanimity. The same
cannot be said of developing economies. With a handful of exceptions, notably in East and
South-East Asia, virtually all developing economies were plunged into sustained recession -- and
in many instances outright depression -- by the financial turmoil of the 1980s. Commodity
prices slumped, investment inflows dried up, and manufacturing capacities disappeared. The
West agreed to furnish assistance in highly selective ways. For a handful of large economies
whose industries and control of resources exerted significant impact on Western economies, such
as those of Mexico and Brazil, particularized “rescue” programs -- the “Baker” and “Brady”
plans -- were crafted.233 Most developing economies, however, had the choice either of adopting
draconian structural adjustment policies under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank,234 or
muddling through as best they could. By the end of the 1980s, then, the revolutionary zeal for a
restructured international economy was not even a plausible dream for much of the non-Western
world.
D. Human Rights and the State: Clarifying the Links
The inclusion within Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter of two subjects that
international lawyers today tend to address as separate items -- human rights and economic
growth -- is a reminder that advances in science and technology do not automatically imply
social progress. Chapter VIII clearly evinced a recognition at the end of World War II of the
intertwining of human rights and economic wellbeing; a relationship that we might fairly refer to
as “social justice.” As the 1980s drew to a close with an increasingly impoverished,
demoralized, and defeated “Third World” on the one hand, and the 1990s opened with a vibrant
and triumphant West on the other, the international legal system was offered two distinctive
routes to travel. First, one could identify those ideas, institutions, and arrangements of the
successful West and impose or otherwise graft them on international society. This was the route,
that as I have described, international legal scholars adopted.235 But there was an alternative
approach to international legal scholars. This approach would have required trying to understand
why the Third World experiments failed, reasons that are not necessarily the flip sides of those
for the successes of the West. International law then could have built on that understanding to
formulate standards and rules that took account of the particular circumstances of the Third
World, and which reflected those circumstances in the guiding norms out of which international
rules are generated. Indeed, this was an approach advocated by those who argued international
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law encompassed a “right to development.”236 The complete failure of these advocates to gain a
hearing in the mainstream of international legal scholarship is, in the view of this writer, the best
testimonial to the hollowness of the claim of an international community. An exploration of the
reasons for going down one road, while rejecting the other, is thus worth undertaking as a
penultimate effort at understanding our contemporary conception of “the international
community.”
In Part II, I described how international legal norms moved seemingly overnight from
being concerned primarily with outlawing the use of force and the protection of a state’s
sovereign prerogatives to embracing the selective (but frequently framed as ‘collective’) use of
force.237 Similarly, under the aegis of protecting human rights, international law norms in the
1990s selectively shunned the notion of sovereignty in favor of protecting individual rights.238
But the legal doctrines that were advanced in support of these policies were neither clearly
articulated nor consistently applied. I’d like to suggest that an important reason for this lack of
principled intelligibility is that the rules were derived from a very narrow focus on events in
international society. As I have shown, the basic driving force of changes in the 1990s was the
collapse of communism as an organizing ideology and of the power of the states that invoked it.
Western intellectuals -- certainly those who framed international legal doctrines -- transformed
the defeat of communism into a license for the propagation and, when necessary, imposition of
Western liberal norms. This attitude, in hindsight, may seem (as it was) parochial; but it was not
unintelligible under the circumstances. The rules of the international society have been the rules
of interstate relations among the European system of states. Did it not follow that an
international community, even one that aspired to the regulation and protection of individuals,
must be based on those European rules that were left standing after the collapse of an opposing
normative system? Certainly the joy with which long-suffering Somalis, under the glare of
television cameras, welcomed United Nations “humanitarian relief” and “peace keeping”
soldiers in 1992 was not unlike the warmth felt by Germans (and indeed much of the Western
world) with the fall of the Berlin Wall three years earlier. Likewise, the failure of the Security
council to adopt adequate measures safeguarding Rwandans from the massacres that occurred in
that country in 1994 has been subject to no less criticism than that to which the United Nations
has been subject as a result of the Srebrenica massacres in Bosnia-Herzegovina a year later. Yet,
to deploy these examples as emblematic of the functioning of international legal rules in the
1990s is to misconstrue exceptions as the rule. These examples, at best, provide superficial
parallels. In reality, they mask fundamental differences between the structures of European
societies and those of non-European ones. Even more importantly, the reliance on them
perpetuates the myth of an evenhanded “universal rule of law” regime. Let us explore that myth
by a closer inspection of the underlying premises of the doctrinal developments in international
law in the 1990s.
The central and unifying undercurrent of the international legal order of the 1990s was
suspicion of and hostility towards the institution of the state. This undercurrent had several
sources; many of them well founded. The state, following World War II, had become an
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omnipresent and excessively intrusive institution. The boundaries of its power had reached far
beyond the traditional functions of providing security and infrastructures to extensive and direct
participation in the ordinary social and economic life of its citizens. The scope of the
involvement varied, and much of it was doubtless beneficial. But by the 1990s, at least in the
West, the perception of the state was often more readily associated with a “heavy hand” than
with a light touch. And this perception was particularly strong when Westerners thought of the
non-West. Communist countries, of course, had been the quintessential state-dominated society,
but the “authoritarian dictatorships” that had become the dominant form of governance in the
Third World were not far behind. These dictatorships did not only control “with a dead hand”
the economic life of the society, but they suppressed civil liberties, arbitrarily imprisoned and
tortured opponents, and otherwise silenced opposition. In short, the state had become a
“predator.” In contrast, the thriving socio-political and economic life of the West was
characterized increasingly by a downplay of the role of the state in the affairs of the community.
In Western Europe, ancient nationalisms were giving way to a supranational union and the
ensuing liberalization of the movements of people, ideas, and economic activities with minimal
state interference had become characteristic not only of the European Union, but of liberal,
industrial democracies in North America and parts of Asia. In moving to embrace the Western
way of life, Central and East Europeans had shown that “getting the state out” was essential.
“Privatization,” the formation of “civil society,” and decentralization were preferable alternatives
to the state. Discrediting and undermining the role of the state in Third World governance thus
seemed worthy objectives for liberal and neoconservative intellectuals alike.239 But this
sentiment, however sincerely held, was fostered by an unreflective accounting of the differences
between the role of the state in European and non-European communities.
That accounting must start with the recognition of the state as a dynamic institution that
is shaped more by historical experience than by any ideational conception. It is true that the
modern state has its roots in the structures of governance that evolved out of the West European
experience. Most Third World countries were not only fashioned by European colonial rules, but
at independence they inherited -- virtually lock, stock and barrel -- colonial institutions of
governance. And, at the international level, the now-decolonized countries sought and received
admission and were otherwise welcomed into the community of states with all of the attributes of
de jure sovereignty. In time, they learned -- perhaps all too well -- how to play the “balance of
power game” which Europe, following World War II, had bequeathed to the U.S. and the USSR.
But these similarities masked fundamental differences between the functioning of the state in the
West, and its functioning in the newly decolonized states. At the core of these differences is an
appreciation of the state as an organic entity -- in a real sense, a community -- that grows and
matures through the shared experiences of its members. The European state did not spring into
being through fiat. It was the product of continuous conflict, compromises, accords, broken
agreements, revised arrangements, and more conflict. Sometimes the state was imposed from
without, but it remained fragile until the members accommodated themselves to each other; and
often that accommodation did not occur until the members had essentially worn themselves out
in their blood-letting. State formation can be and has been romanticized, but it is not romantic.
239

Of course, Western conservatives and liberals differed on the elements of reconfiguration they deemed essential;
but the differences were rooted in subject matter, not in the underlying concept. For example, conservatives were
more likely to emphasize privatization than liberals, while the latter focused on political decentralization and
individual autonomy. Obviously, such differences were driven by preferred economic and political outcomes rather
than conceptual consistency.

It is the product of arduous experimentation. Above all, the ingredients for the experiment and
its ultimate success depend entirely on those who come to constitute the state.
This organic understanding of the state was entirely absent in the myriad appraisals of the
“failed” Third World state that followed the end of the Cold War. Among Western intellectuals
and Third World elites, alike, strife has been seen as undermining the right of a society to claim
statehood. The solution to strife, it has more often than not been proposed by liberals and
conservatives alike, is the denial of sovereignty or the imposition of a solution from without.
Equipped with our clairvoyant technologies and confident of our moral superiority, the object of
inquiry has become to identify and classify the victim and the victimizer. Sure of our power, we
seek to impose punishment on the wrongdoer. But surely this is shortsighted. A recognition and
acceptance of the state as an organic entity entails toleration of strife as a necessary, if
unfortunate, component of community formation. Indeed, those affective ties that are present in
all true communities typically are strengthened by the processes of conflict, bargaining, and
reconciliation. If the state is more than a utilitarian deliverer of services, and there are reasons to
believe it is, then its members should be encouraged to interact with each other, and international
law should not operate to cut off those interactions.
It is indisputable that, to the extent one of the cardinal functions of a state is to provide a
stable environment within which its citizens can undertake peaceably and with satisfaction the
broad range of civic engagements that make human coexistence truly social, many Third World
states fall short of the standard. Civil wars, the malfunctioning of governmental institutions,
poor physical infrastructure, and abuse of power are pervasive. Yet, it is a fundamental
misapprehension to believe that any but an insignificant number of the citizens of these states
would gladly renounce their connections to the state in favor of an amorphous “international
community.” The “community” that matters to the individual – and indeed to the group – is not
an ideal garden of Lotus-eaters, but the daily interactions of the shared pain of despair and the
joys of euphoria with neighbors that are essential to state formation. The dysfunctional state is
not fixed by coercive legal intervention from without, but by the internal tug and pull of the
conflicting interests of citizens.
Regardless of the preferences of the international legal scholar or jurist, this untidy
process of state formation in the Third World is bound to continue. The international legal
system lacks the capacity to terminate it prematurely. What the system can and has done is to
impose additional costs on the process. Those costs come in the form of several diversionary
illusions which both delay and increase the costs of state formation. One such illusion, for
example, is that international law can operate directly on individual wrongdoers without the
intervention of the state.240 But the idea presupposes a genuine international community
composed of individuals. However, what has become increasingly clear is that the idea is given
effect primarily by distinguishing among communities. As the United States succeeds in
obtaining exemptions for its citizens,241 while encouraging special prosecutors to wield their
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powers discriminatorily against others,242 continuing to shroud these obvious duplicities in the
rhetoric of international or universal human solidarity will become less and less tenable not only
to the Third World states, but more importantly, to their nationals.243 These citizens, who in the
1990s looked to the international system to satisfy the negative but entirely understandable
human desire for punishment, will return to the state to provide the equally essential human
bonding that is created by shared struggle and conflict. Indeed, in the Third World, it will have
to do so as an essential element of growth.244 The international system and its powerful member
states can, of course, exert pressure on individual societies and states, as in fact it has done
during the last decade, but the cost of this approach will be so great and the gains so insubstantial
that the system will have to bow to the reality that lasting communities are formed less by
ideological pull or the pressures of punishment, and more by the interactions of proximity,
shared needs, and histories.
Although human rights activists often view themselves as championing the rights of
individuals over those of the state, this position is at best chimerical, and not infrequently
deceptive. As already demonstrated, the distinctive contribution of human rights activism to
international law in the last decade has been not so much the focus on the individualization of
rights, but rather on the insistence that those rights be enforced through coercive measures. But
whether those measures are judicial compulsion or economic sanctions, they depend for their
initiation and enforcement on the intervention of the state. Thus, it turns out that far from
limiting state intervention, contemporary human rights law depends for its vitality on the active
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involvement of the state.245 But of course, the state whose involvement is insisted upon is rarely
that to which the offender claims membership and succor, but rather that of the avenging and
paternalistic West. And, furthermore, the costs of the sanctions are imposed directly and
disproportionately on the very individuals whose protection, ostensibly, the human rights
activists seek to further. Iraqi children246 and undeniably innocent and apolitical Liberian
lumberjacks and other workers,247 for example, are made to pay collectively for the sins of their
leaders. Thus, human rights activism, driven as it currently is by the smug satisfaction of the
certainty of the moral superiority of Western institutions and practices, and a determined if
selective application of punitive measures, reinforces the hierarchy and subordination that the
West presumably had abandoned when it embraced principles of self-determination and
decolonization. This resuscitation of coercion as the default means for imposing legal order
might be accepted as a necessary price for civilized interdependence were it not integral to the
emergence of the use of force as a policy instrument. Dealing with “impunity,” it turns out, is
simply one facet of a much broader phenomenon, the revival of subordination through the use of
force. In both instances, the purveyors of compulsion are accountable to communities distinct
and different from those that bear the consequences of the exercise of power.
E. Aggregation, Disaggregation, and World Order
Toward the end of the decade of the 1990s, a long-discarded concept gained prominence
in the lexicon of international law: “humanitarian intervention.” In reality, the concept was the
rehash of an academic idea that the Biafran and Bangladeshi civil wars had provoked, but which
had died stillborn. Now, the idea was revived primarily because the issue was no longer
“academic.” While the Cold War acted as a check on the translation of theory into practice, the
existence of a sole superpower willing and able to impose its fancies as reality made it possible
for an idea accepted by its academic scholars to become realizable. And so in Kosovo there was
no other recognizable theory on which NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, unsought and
unwelcome by the state and unapproved by the United Nations Security Council, could be
justified other than the hitherto discarded theory of “humanitarian intervention.” And because
“humanitarian intervention” is likely to provide the cloak in which the justifications for the
subjugations and the differential treatments of the other will be wrapped, at least in the present
and the near-future, it is worth closer attention.
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Much ink has been spilled debating whether the concept has any basis in existing law,248
or whether while lacking “legal basis,” it may nonetheless be “legitimate.”249 Whatever else may
be said about the concept, that it is a logical and probably inevitable follow on from the belief
that the international legal order should sanction the use of coercion in furtherance of human
rights seems unassailable. If it is appropriate for one state or group of states to employ judicial
or legislative power to punish another state or its agents for the violation of the rights of the
citizens of the latter states, it surely makes sense for the former group to act preemptively to
forestall or to terminate such human rights violations. But who gets to make the decision, and on
what evidence? Although these are often presented as posing unique challenges to humanitarian
intervention, in fact they are not. They are precisely the same set of issues confronted in the use
of international tribunals to adjudicate “crimes against humanity,” or of “genocide,” let alone
“war crimes” or “crimes of aggression.”250 The amorphousness of the elements in play in
determining when there has been “such massive human rights violations” to as to permit external
intervention in the one is no different from those in the other. Both are equally susceptible of
gerrymandered dispositions. And while adjudication is retrospective and, therefore, more likely
to be bounded by the specificity of the inquiry that is undertaken, that is no assurance that it will
not be subverted to serve non-criminal purposes.
The indisputable reality is that the clamors for “humanitarian intervention” and for “war
crimes” trials invariably go hand-in-hand. They are used simultaneously to delegitimize the
policies of an undesirable government, and to prepare the public for what is now generally
referred to as “regime change.” Allegations are proffered. These readily are picked up by
media that has learned to expect and to sell the worst, and the broadly disseminated information,
now endowed with the aura of veracity by virtue of repetition, becomes a justification for policy.
In this environment, it is less what “happened,” but the capacity to influence and manipulate the
media that determines outcome. And it is from this vantage point that the justifications for the
recent invasion and occupation of Iraq merit some attention; for just as Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait in 1990 (or, more accurately, the international response to that invasion) represented the
beginnings of the post-Cold War international legal order,251 its recent invasion and occupation -or more accurately the evidentiary fiasco surrounding the justifications for the invasion -- may
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well mark a watershed in the unskeptical approval of the use of force to promote purported
humanitarian goals.
In August, 1990, Iraq invaded, occupied, and sought to annex Kuwait. While the two
countries had disputed the precise demarcation of their borders, the attempted wholesale
annexation was highly unusual in the post-World War II era. It certainly presented a direct
challenge to the basic principles of international relations that had emerged following World War
II. The unanimity of the condemnation of the act was not, therefore, surprising; but the
willingness of the Security Council to adopt measures under Chapter VII constituted a radical
departure from previous instances in which, despite clear-cut violations of international law, the
most that the Security Council generally had been able to muster were recommendatory or
condemnatory resolutions under Chapter VI. Most dramatically, under Resolution 678,252 the
Security Council authorized member states to use “all necessary means” to restore Kuwait’s
territorial integrity. Purportedly acting under this provision, the United States formed a coalition
of states -- including West European and Arab countries -- that successfully expelled Iraqi forces
from Kuwait.
The end of combat was followed by an equally unusual series of practices. The United
States field commander and an Iraqi general signed the armistice, but the terms for peace took
the form of a Security Council mandatory resolution. Under Resolution 687, the United Nations
undertook to demarcate independently the boundaries between the two countries. Iraq, as a
defeated state, was required to account for and return non-Iraqis lost in Kuwait, for Kuwaiti
property in its possession, and to pay reparations to injured persons and for lost property. These
conditions, together with those which limited its capacity to develop rockets with ranges
exceeding 150 km., were relatively uncontroversial. Two other sets of requirements, however,
and particularly the means for enforcing those conditions, heralded a new era, and one that was
characteristic of the ethos of the 1990s that have been extensively discussed in this article.
In the first place, Iraq was required to identify and destroy all of its holdings of
unconventional weaponry: nuclear, biological and chemical, including any means or
technologies for their acquisition. An international inspection body to be paid for by Iraq was to
be set up to supervise and monitor the destruction of these so-called “weapons of mass
destruction” Iraq was required to give to this international body -- initially referred to as the
United Nations Surveillance Committee -- unimpeded access to all of its territory and officials.
And, to enforce these dictates, the comprehensive economic sanctions that had been imposed on
Iraq prior to the war were to be maintained subject to waivers granted by the U.N. Sanctions
Committee. The Committee could give blanket waivers for whole categories of imports, or
discretionarily grant or refuse waivers on a product-by-product or contract-by-contract basis.
Indeed, it could condition a waiver on the modification of the terms of a contract, and a waiver
otherwise acceptable to the Committee could be blocked by the capricious act of a single
member of the Committee.253Furthermore, proceeds from Iraq’s export of oil were to be placed
in escrow accounts that were subject to the control of the United Nations. Invoices for
authorized imports were submitted to the United Nations, and payments of those invoices were
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subject again to United Nations approval. Meanwhile, individual persons claiming reparations
from Iraq could submit their claims to the United Nations, and these claims were approved or
rejected by the United Nations. And all of these practices and regulations occurred within a
resolution that “affirmed” the territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq.254
Secondly, in a subsequent resolution, Iraq was reminded of its obligation to protect the
human rights of its citizens. This rebuke was supposedly made necessary by the treatment of
Iraqi Kurds in the North of the country, and of Iraqi Shiites in the South. Although Resolution
688 was enacted under Chapter VI, the United States, the United Kingdom and – for a while –
France interpreted the resolution as authorizing them to create a “protected zone” and a
“protective corridor” for the Kurds and Shiites, respectively. They asserted the right to fly over
Iraq, and to shoot down any fixed-wing Iraqi planes found outside of a narrow corridor in the
central part of the country. As a result, the Iraqi government lost administrative control over the
northern part of the country, and effective control of two-thirds of its air-space. And these
decisions were taken and effected with the United Nations Security Council, and indeed the
member-states of the United Nations playing the role of silent bystanders, neither endorsing nor
rejecting the decisions taken in Washington and London. Iraq occasionally challenged the flyovers, but it appears to have paid quite significant penalties for such challenges. Indeed, the only
reminders of the persistence of this silent war were the periodic news flashes informing the
world of the use of ordinance by U.S. and U.K. military planes in response to Iraqi air-defense
measures, or claims by the Iraqi government of the death of Iraqi civilians as a result of the
dropping of ordinance on them.
Thus, between 1991 and 1998, the “international community” continued to endow Iraq
with the attributes of sovereignty, while comprehensively emasculating its exercise. As one
might expect of the defeated state that it was, Iraq by and large had been pliant. By 1998,
however, the hierarchical structure of the “new world order” seemed so well settled that those at
its apex deemed adherence to form entirely superfluous. What was expected from the likes of
Iraq was no longer mere obedience, but abject submission. Humiliation, rather than obtaining a
specific substantive policy outcome had become the paramount object of U.K. and U.S. policies
towards Iraq.
In 1998, the United States Congress passed legislation authorizing the President of the
United States to spend in excess of $90 million to procure the overthrow of the government of
Iraq.255 During the same period, UNSCOM inspections were conducted in a more and more
confrontational manner, and the hitherto open secret that several of the inspectors were in fact
intelligence agents ceased to receive even pro forma denials.256 In what apparently was the trial
run for a technique that was to be applied six months later against Serbia, a non-negotiable
ultimatum was issued to Iraq requiring it, among other things, to open up all government
buildings, including the residence of its head-of-state to inspection upon demand by
UNSCOM.257 When Iraq refused to comply, UNSCOM officials were withdrawn, and there
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followed three days of punitive bombings by the United States and the United Kingdom. At the
end of these bombings, matters returned to the status quo: The United Nations – or more
accurately, the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council – continued to dictate the pace of
economic life in Iraq; the United States and United Kingdom controlled Iraqi air space, and the
rest of international society essentially stood on the sidelines, tantalized by the occasional flairups, but otherwise more or less indifferent to the plight of Iraqis.
This indeterminate state of affairs might have continued for quite sometime to come,
except that for reasons whose explanations remain at best confused, the United States
government in August, 2002, decided to precipitate a crisis and to overthrow the Iraqi
government. Moving on two fronts, the United States first sought a Security Council Resolution
requiring the unconditional readmission into Iraq of U.N. inspectors, and the unfettered access of
these inspectors to whatever sites they might seek to investigate in Iraq. The Resolution was
duly adopted.258 Concurrently, the United States began to move substantial numbers of its forces
into the Persian Gulf area, and made it plain that it intended to go to war with Iraq. This twotrack approach generated a good deal of confusion within international society. At the core of
that confusion was a poor understanding of what drove U.S. policy. The United States offered a
variety of reasons for its policies, and it was far from clear whether these reasons operated
independently, or whether they were mutually reinforcing. Furthermore, it was also far from
certain that the proffered reasons were not simply pre-textual.
Among the reasons offered by the United States were that: (1) Iraq had failed to comply
with mandated obligations under various Security Council resolutions; (2) Iraq presented a
threat to the United States and her friends by its possession of “weapons of mass destruction”;
(3) Iraq was an ally of terrorists, and the President of the United States had warned that it was
the mission of the United States to wage war against terrorists and their allies; (4) the President
of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and his government had oppressed Iraqis and therefore he had to be
removed from office; (5) regime change in Iraq would facilitate the development of democratic
institutions in both Iraq and the Arab world, generally. Two additional reasons were advanced
by commentators. (i) A successful war against Iraq would give the United States control over
the second largest proven reserves of crude oil in the World, making it possible for the United
States to influence significantly the price and supply of this core commodity. (ii) Control of Iraq
would give the United States unparalleled geopolitical leverage over events in the Middle-East,
which would include the power to shape determinatively the outcome of the long-persisting
Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine.
Whatever may be the wisdom of the political and economic reasoning that underlay these
justifications, only the first three of them merited attention as grounded in serious legal
doctrines; and even then, these three as legal arguments had to be reduced to two propositions:
First, that the purported violations of Security Council resolutions by Iraq entitled the United
States and its “coalition of the willing” to invade Iraq; or, secondly, that Iraq’s alleged
possession of “weapons of mass destruction” or its support of terrorists presented such danger to
the United States or its allies that a war against Iraq was permitted by the doctrine of selfdefense.

258

See SC Res. 1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).

The first proposition, although noisily contended by the United Kingdom259 cannot be
given credence by any serious international lawyer.260 Under Chapter VII, the Security Council
may of course enforce its own resolutions261 and, somewhat more doubtful, it may be that it can
“contract out” enforcement to others.262 At issue was whether prior Security Council resolutions
were such that the Security Council had already acted to contract out future enforcement. The
argument was advanced on two grounds. First, that the authorization to use “all necessary
means” to expel Iraq from Kuwait found in Resolution 678, along with the adoption of
Resolutions 687, 688, and 1441, somehow conferred authority on individual member states or
collection of states to enforce Security Council Resolutions.263 Secondly, that Resolution 1441
independently conferred such authority. These arguments most charitably can be described as
disingenuous. The authorization for the use of force in Resolution 678 was limited to Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait, and it is difficult to see how that authorization survived the adoption of
Resolution 687. Nothing in the provisions of Resolution 687 hints that the terms of that
Resolution could be enforced by attacking Iraq. To the contrary, the Resolution explicitly
provided the means for its enforcement: the continuation of economic sanctions and the use of
intrusive inspections. Resolution 688 was not adopted under Chapter VII, and nothing in the
wording of the Resolution can be construed as authorizing the use of force against Iraq.
The argument of independent authority under Resolution 1441 had two aspects, both
equally weak. The first was that in stating that Iraq’s failure to comply with the Resolution
would raise “serious consequences,” the Resolution had thereby authorized the use of force.
“Serious consequences” was said to be a term of art identical with “all necessary means.” If so,
why the latter term was not used has never been explained. The second aspect of the argument
was that members of the Security Council who adopted Resolution 1441 knew that by its
adoption they were authorizing the use of force should it become necessary. Diplomacy is, of
course, a dismal art; yet when it comes to the Security council contracting out the authority of
international society to use force, it is fair to insist on something more than a handful of the
members of international society asserting that such authority had been conferred by nods and
winks, especially when the majority of the members of the Council asserted both
contemporaneously and after the fact that they were conferring no such authority.
While the United States made a pass at invoking similar arguments, it relied primarily on
a different set of legal claims. It contended that Iraq presented a military threat, and that the
doctrine of self-defense provided the requisite justification for its use of force. But the doctrine
of self-defense, at least in its standard formulation, was not readily applicable to the situation.
The doctrine ordinarily is triggered by an actual attack, or at least the imminent threat of an
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attack.264 Although Iraq’s alleged possession of “WMDs” was said to present a potential threat,
the imminence of that threat was dubious.265 But the United States did not restrict itself to the
well-trodden path of the law. It created and amplified the doctrine of “preventive defense,”
under which it contended that it could and indeed should anticipate any and all threats to its
security, and act to forestall such threats well ahead of time.266 The only apparent check on the
scope of this doctrine is the policy judgment of the United States; dictated, one assumes, by its
capacity to implement it. It is thus difficult to view it as a “legal” doctrine; certainly not one that
falls within the realm of international law.
There was potentially a third set of legal arguments available to the British and United
States governments. This was the argument of “humanitarian intervention.” What is striking is
that neither government resorted to it. The two governments, of course, demonized Saddam
Hussein and his government. The two governments pointed to the past atrocities and cruelties of
the Iraqi government with regard to mass injuries caused by its alleged prior use of Chemical
weapons, the suppression of revolts, and to individual cases of torture. These, however, were
presented not as legal grounds for waging war against Iraq, but as descriptions of the evils that
would be done away with by the overthrow of the Iraqi government. Thus, they were not the
bases for war, but the collateral consequences of a successful war. A few journalists and
propagandists did argue for the elevation of these considerations to the status of casus belli, but
neither government accepted this advice.267
Why did governments that were willing to invoke remarkably weak – and indeed
extralegal arguments – to justify war with Iraq resist invoking “humanitarian intervention” as the
basis for the war? Surely, it cannot be because of the weakness of the factual basis or legal
support for the arguments that would have been available to them. The evidence of past Iraqi
government atrocities were hardly any less compelling than those of its possession of WMDs.
An alternative ground is the lack of a firm basis in international law for the doctrine, but one
might validly question whether this absence of support is any weaker for humanitarian
264

See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, American Exceptionalism and the International Law of Self-Defense, 31 DEN. J.
INT’L L. AND POL. 43 (2002); Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L.
L. 559 (2003).
265

Although the United Kingdom claimed that Iraq could launch Biological or Chemical weapons within 45 minutes
(a claim whose accuracy has become the subject of extensive debate and obfuscation), no one, even in those heady
days between September, 2002 and March, 2003, remotely suggested that Iraq would do so unless it were attacked.
Indeed, the CIA Director argued otherwise. See, Paul Reynolds, CIA Undermines Propaganda War, BBC
WORLDNEWS, October 10, 2002. The primary argument with regard to the imminence of the threat posed by Iraq
revolved around how long it would take Iraq to build nuclear weapons, and here estimates ranged from six months
to ten years or more. See Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, Unclassified
Summary of a US National Intelligence Estimate NIE, approved for publication in January 10, 2002, by the National
Foreign Intelligence Board, under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. And, of course, there
remained the imponderable of whether, even assuming Iraqi possessed “WMDs,” it would deploy it against the
United States or its “friends.” For the “imminence” of a threat is dependent as much on the certainty (or lack) of
intent as it is on the immediacy of timing.
266

See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020920-6.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
267
A distinctly different argument, but one that is all-too-frequently conflated with the humanitarian one, is that of
“bringing democracy” to the Iraqi people. It is a testimony to the short-life of intellectual theorizing that its
proponents do not bother to differentiate this argument from those advanced barely a generation ago in support of
continued European imperial and colonial rule over Afro-Asian societies.

intervention than it is for “preventive” (or even ‘preemptive”) defense. The former doctrine had
been at the core of the Kosovo war, and various facets of it arguably influenced international
involvement in the internal governance of such societies as Cambodia, Somalia, Haiti, BosniaHerzegovina, and East Timor. Its pedigree, therefore, however suspect was no less firmly rooted
than that of “preventive defense.”
There are, of course, two fundamental differences between intervention in Kosovo and
the invasion of Iraq. They are “location” and “location.” The “humanitarian intervention” by
NATO in Kosovo occurred against a backdrop of the seven-year process of disintegration of the
former Yugoslavia in an area of Europe with well-deserved reputation for plunging the continent
into unrestrained warfare. The barbarities of the Balkan wars of the 1990s were indeed throwbacks to a period of European history that a generation and more of Europeans had come to
believe to be forever buried in the past. Yet, the disintegration of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia had precipitated long-forgotten alliances and combinations. Here was a United
Germany ignoring tentative understandings with her fellow European Community members and
extending diplomatic recognition to break-away units of Yugoslavia. There were the French and
Russians backing “Serb nationalists,” and the Greek and Russian support of “orthodox” coreligionists. And, of course, there was Srebrenica with its echoes of mass murder camps. Seven
years of reversions to type were enough, and Europe was determined Kosovo would not be a
repeat. And, then, there was the pending expansion of NATO which was to be consummated at
the Organization’s 50th anniversary that was to occur in April 1999. Kosovo was thus a
“humanitarian intervention” that was necessitated by the geopolitical interests of Western
Europe.
Iraq had oil. In fighting against Iran, another oil-rich state, it had received the active
assistance of the United States. But it had made the mistake of invading Kuwait, another oil-rich
country, and it threatened Saudi Arabia, yet another oil-rich country that was hosting a large
concentration of U.S. military personnel. Nor did Iraq make any secret of its antagonism to
Israel. Indeed, of the so-called “rejectionist fronts,” it remained by far the most bellicose of panArab anti-Israeli states. To be sure, it had oppressed the Kurds and might have used chemical
weapons against them and Iran, but there was no evidence that the human rights situation in Iraq
in 2002 was any different than it had been in 1989 or 1999. But then, the “human right” to life
of President George H.W. Bush had apparently been threatened by Iraq in 1993, and his son was
President of the United States in 2002. Might it not be unreasonable to insist then that under
these circumstances, the leaders of the “free world” should allow their decision-making to be
hamstrung by “law,” however venerable one might believe the institution of “the rule of law” to
be?
To no one’s surprise, the United States smashed the Iraqi army in virtually no time.
Ruling the conquered territory has proved, however, to be more taxing than U.S. leaders
apparently had anticipated or planned for. They have gone back to the United Nations268 (a body
which the president of the United States had warned would be “irrelevant” if it did not follow his
lead), 269and have sought “on humanitarian grounds” the organization’s collaboration in
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essentially creating a “trusteeship” over that land. While the specific terms of that trusteeship
will be the subject of much bargaining, the outcome is indubitable. It is true that France and
Germany, prior to March 18, 2003, disagreed with the United States and the United Kingdom
over the wisdom of invading Iraq without giving international inspectors ample time to prove the
possession of banned weapons by Iraq, but neither country disagreed with or challenged the
policy of “regime change.” Nor did any one in the West appear to give any credence to Iraqi
claims that the country had complied with United Nations demands, and that it had disposed of
all prohibited weapons. Iraq, as the “other,” could not be believed or trusted. What
distinguished the French and the Germans from their Anglo-Saxon brethren and sisters was
simply that the former were willing to invoke anthropology and history to temper their legal
certainties, while the latter could only think of the present.270 The disagreements among the
Western powers thus were over means – and then, only in the short-term – not over facts or
goals. No doubt the logic of “humanitarianism,” buttressed by that of economics, will result in
the coalescence of means. The reality is that just as no one doubted the “force de frappe”
notwithstanding that De Gaulle would support NATO in a conflict with the Soviet Union,
Western Europe, in solidarity, will hitch its cart to the United States horse. That, after all, is the
driving logic of membership in a “community,” and thereby in the definition of who constitutes
“the other.”271
CONCLUSIONS
Law, no less than history, is written by the privileged. The privileged progressives of any
given period are those who invariably find fault with the past, and who are confident that in their
prescription for the present, they have identified and removed the causes of that hideous past.
The fall of the Berlin wall signified the triumph of the liberal heirs of European enlightenment
over their totalitarian competitors. The search for a humane society was at an end because we
had arrived at it. All that remained was to make that end-product universal. Western
international law scholars – and many of the non-Western mimics – embraced both consciously
and subliminally this vision of history. “Human rights law” was natural justice specified, and in
its propagation, the best that humanity had to offer was personified. Then, on Sept. 11, 2001,
three hi-jacked aircrafts were used as missiles against symbols of United States power, and about
three thousand persons were killed. The United States unleashed the full might of its power:
military, political, economic, and financial. Legal protections hitherto thought to be integral to
core American notions of due process and fair treatment were swept overboard in a flash.
270

Thus, the French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, in his February 5, 2003 presentation to the Security
Council could speak of France as an old country, hinting not only to its European pedigree, but its colonial
experience in the Middle-East; an experience that the new United States sure of its present might could only scoff at.
See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADOX AND POWER, supra note 1.
271
For an apparently unselfconsciously cartoonish proposal of how the post-Iraq revamped structure of Western
domination of “the other” might look, see Dominique Moisi, Reinventing the West, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 67 (Nov.-Dec.
2003) (“The result might amount to something like the acceptance of two Monroe Doctrines, with the transatlantic
partners each holding sway in certain areas, and on certain issues, that reflect their de facto spheres of interest.
Europeans would concentrate on Europe, with a special emphasis on the Balkans and the Mediterranean, and the
United States would have priority in the Americas and in Asia. Both Wests would support moderate leaders and
promote the rule of law in their respective spheres of influence. They would collaborate in the Middle East,
attempting to close the emotional gap between them over the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. And the two sides would
also come together over a new doctrine of enlightened interventionism in Africa.”). Plus ca change, plus la meme
chose.

“9/11,” went the refrain, “changed everything”; and, it might be added, we are back in the dark
ages in which might is about all that counts. The last ashes of the pseudo-progressivism of 1989
were thus swept aside. No one today believes that history has ended, or that it is likely to end
any time soon. As in the past, contemporary international society is embarked on reconstructing
the current order so that it reflects the distribution of power among its participants. In doing so,
the division between “us” and “them” continues to be pivotal.
This essay, then, has sought to place the development of international legal concepts
within the framework of the social and institutional structures of international society. It has
eschewed the tendency to present international law as a neutral instrument for the principled
exercise of power. However admirable a normative objective it might be to pretend that
international law operates with an international community of more or less equal individuals, the
essay has pointed out some of the multiple dichotomies that crisscross the international legal
order. The divisions reflect both ideological and institutional interests. It is the basic argument
of the essay that only by taking account of these divisions can one fairly articulate with any level
of accuracy the operative doctrines and norms in international law. Central to the development
of international law, the essay has argued, has been a persistent divide between those accepted as
members of the community, and those who were viewed as outsiders. International law did not
create those divisions; nor has it succeeded in bridging them for any extended period of time.
This was no less true in the last decade of universal sisterhood than it had been in previous
decades. To assign international law a task in which it is bound to fail is to do no good to any
one.
Without rejecting the relevance of law to the structure and constitution of communities, a
core suggestion of the essay is that communities are not created by law; rather, communities
create law as a response to their needs. The argument that posits (or which seeks to found) the
existence of an international community on the basis of law is therefore to be rejected.
International law must take its place as no more than one of the multiple social institutions that
function within a community. To assert that the interests of individuals, rather than of nation
states, have become instrumental in the composition of international community is to perpetuate
the fiction that has long shrouded the domination of the other by the us.

